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ABSTRACT. Conflicts between biodiversity conservation and other human activities are multifaceted. Understanding farmer
preferences for various conflict mitigation strategies is therefore critical. We developed a novel interactive game around farmer land
management decisions across 18 villages in Gabon to examine responses to three elephant conflict mitigation options: use of elephant
deterrent methods, flat-rate subsidy, and agglomeration payments rewarding coordinated action for setting land aside for elephants. We
found that all three policies significantly reduced participants’ inclinations to engage in lethal control. Use of deterrents and agglomeration
payments were also more likely to reduce decisions to kill elephants in situations where levels of social equity were higher. Only the two
monetary incentives increased farmers’ predisposition to provide habitats for elephants, suggesting that incentive-based instruments
were conducive to pro-conservation behavior; different subsidy levels did not affect responses. Likewise, neither participants’
socioeconomic characteristics nor their real-life experiences of crop damage by elephants affected game decisions. Killing behavior in
the games was 64% lower in villages influenced by protected areas than in villages surrounded by logging concessions, highlighting the
need to address conservation conflicts beyond protected areas. Our study shows the importance of addressing underlying social conflicts,
specifically equity attitudes, prior to, or alongside addressing material losses.
Key Words: conservation conflict; human behavior; human–elephant conflict; human–wildlife conflict; interactive game; monetary incentives;
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INTRODUCTION
Conflicts over conservation endeavors (or “conservation
conflicts”) not only undermine effective conservation, but also
hamper sustainable development (Redpath et al. 2013). Many such
conflicts involve species of conservation concern that damage
crops or prey on livestock, and are often killed in retaliation by
affected farmers. Such problems are commonly framed as human–
wildlife conflicts (Woodroffe et al. 2005). However, beneath the
material manifestations of these impacts lie deeper and more
complex social conflicts between different social groups (Dickman
2010, Peterson et al. 2010, Madden and McQuinn 2015, Hill et al.
2017). At the core of these conflicts is the involvement of multiple
stakeholders with conflicting values and agendas (Redpath et al.
2013). If  the non-material needs of affected stakeholders (e.g.,
farmers) are not also adequately considered, interventions to
address wildlife impacts might fail to mitigate conservation
conflicts through lack of engagement, uptake, and follow-through
by farmers (Hill et al. 2017). For instance, increased concern over
social equity among stakeholders has been associated with a
decreased likelihood of finding solutions to biodiversity-related
conflicts (Young et al. 2013, 2016a). For our purposes, equity may
relate to: (1) recognition, i.e., the equitability of cost allocation
across national conservation and development strategies; (2)
procedural equity, which refers to participation in decision-making
processes; and (3) distributive equity, which addresses the
distribution of benefits and costs (McDermott et al. 2013). Given
the complex nature of conservation conflicts, devising the best
interventions to mitigate conflicts is a growing priority for policy
makers (e.g., Young et al. 2016b, Mason et al. 2018).  
We developed a highly interactive game to understand how
farmers respond to alternative conflict intervention strategies in
Gabon (Rakotonarivo et al. 2021b). Games have emerged as an
effective means to engage stakeholders and enable player
responses, mimicking real-world reactions through immersion
(Redpath et al. 2018). They have been used in a wide range of
contexts such as irrigation (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2016), fisheries
and forests (Cardenas et al. 2013), and agriculture (Bell et al.
2016). Games can help to develop decision-making theory, to
understand patterns in conflict, and to elucidate possible
solutions for environmental issues (Redpath et al. 2018). Games
have been used to foster more sustainable practices or
transformative changes (e.g., Mayer et al. 2014, Rodela et al.
2019), as well as to test theoretical predictions of human behavior
in various natural resource dilemmas (e.g., Cardenas et al. 2013,
Janssen et al. 2010, Travers et al. 2011, Andersson et al. 2018,
Rakotonarivo et al. 2021b). Here, we used a game as a low-cost
and low-risk tool to engage farmers and investigate how they react
to potential management strategies in a setting where real-life
experiments would be impractical. Unlike many behavioral
experiments, which commonly involve high levels of abstraction
and simplified visual representation (Janssen et al. 2014, List and
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Price 2016), our game modeled ecologically relevant temporal and
spatial dynamics at the landscape level using tablet computers and
the Netlogo interface (Wilensky 1999).  
Our game was framed around farmers’ land management
decisions and crop-damaging elephants, a keystone and
charismatic flagship species that symbolizes wildlife conservation
in Asia and Africa. As iconic species, elephants attract tourists
who contribute significantly to some range state economies
(Naidoo et al. 2016). However, elephants can impose considerable
social and financial costs on farmers by damaging crops, food
stores, and water sources, thus impairing local farmers’ well-being
(Mackenzie and Ahabyona 2012, Barua et al. 2013). In addition
to poaching (Poulsen et al. 2017), land-use change, and habitat
loss (Chartier et al. 2011), retaliatory killing of elephants poses a
serious threat to the species’ survival. The increasing intensity of
elephant-related conflicts highlights the pressing need to develop
a better understanding of farmers’ decision-making and its
underpinnings (Evans and Adams 2018, Shaffer et al. 2019).  
Technical interventions to reduce agricultural damage by
elephants at a local level tend to focus on physical and biological
barriers such as fencing, guarding, and the use of repellents
(Nyhus 2016, Pooley et al. 2017, Pozo et al. 2019). Economic
instruments, either through compensation mechanisms for crop
losses (Ravenelle and Nyhus 2017) or financial incentives that
reward a specific conservation outcome, have also been suggested
as effective solutions to conservation conflicts (White and Hanley
2016, Wilson et al. 2017). Incentive-based instruments also
include agglomeration payments, which encourage spatial
coordination of land set aside for conservation by offering
additional payments to farmers enroling adjacent parcels in agri-
environment schemes (Parkhurst and Shogren 2007). Little is
known about the acceptability of various mitigation strategies to
affected farmers or their effect on farmers’ decision-making about
wildlife and land management.  
Our aim was to examine the effects of three mitigation approaches
on local farmers’ propensity to use lethal control or to support
conservation interests through the provision of habitat for
elephants: (1) support for elephant-deterrent techniques designed
to offset costs constraining their adoption; (2) monetary
incentives, a flat subsidy for pro-conservation land uses through
the provision of elephant habitats; and (3) agglomeration
bonuses, designed to encourage spatial coordination in the
adoption of pro-conservation land uses. We explore the
relationship between game outcomes and key socioeconomic and
attitudinal factors, collected using accompanying household
surveys. We expected participants who had stronger preferences
for equity, those with positive perceptions of the well-being effects
of elephants, and those who experienced lower levels of crop
damage by elephants to be less likely to kill elephants and more
likely to provide elephant habitats in the game. We also explored
farmer motives using in-depth debriefing interviews with a
subsample of participants and discuss how interactive games can




We conducted games in two rural areas of Gabon. These areas
included all eight villages near Lopé National Park and within
the World Heritage site associated with the park, which we refer
to as “conservation-influenced villages”, and ten villages within
production forests, which are referred to as “logging-influenced
villages” (Fig. 1, Appendix 1). The two regions were chosen to
cover a range of both exposure to crop damage and reliance on
agriculture. Negative interactions between local farmers and
forest elephants, Loxodonta cyclotis, are widespread at both sites.
However, the protected area adjacent to the conservation villages
might offer better protection for elephants, and more elephants
in adjacent forests might lead to increased crop damage in these
villages (Graham et al. 2010). The availability of alternative
income from logging might also reduce reliance on agriculture in
logging villages and hence lead to reduced capacity to protect
fields from elephants. Elephants in Gabon, as in other African
countries, are known to destroy an entire year’s worth of crops in
a single visit and thus cause serious hardship to subsistence
farmers (Fairet 2012). The rapid expansion of rural employment
in logging concessions across Gabon (Laurance et al. 2006),
compounded by high rural exodus (Fairet et al. 2014) and
extremely low rural population density (0.2 inhabitants/km²;
Laurance et al. 2006) have further led to a reduced capacity to
protect fields.
Fig. 1. Map showing the locations of the study villages in
Gabon. Eight conservation-influenced villages were located
near a national park, and 10 logging-influenced villages were
located away from protected areas.
To protect crops from elephants, local farmers use a range of
traditional methods such as scarecrows, barriers, and cleared field
perimeters (Fairet 2012, Walker 2012, Ngama et al. 2016).
Shooting of problem elephants outside protected areas is
implemented by the government if  the village submits evidence
of extensive crop damage (Fairet 2012). The legislation also
includes the possibility of compensation for crop damage, but
records are not available for the number of claims and
compensations paid. Recently, the Gabonese government has
provided funding to build electric fences around village farmlands
near National Parks to deter elephants (Poole 2016). Only one
village in the study area had benefited from community electric
fencing at the time of the study, and a further three of the study
villages have since received electric fencing.
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Fig. 2. Images of the game screen (English version) showing how the game proceeds. See Fig. 3 for game parameters. (A) The
bottom left corner of the landscape is the active player at round 1; elephants are randomly distributed across the landscape, and the
white number on each cell indicates the number of elephants. (B) Game screen of the active player after all four players have made
decisions. (C) Game screen at the start of round 2; actions taken by other players in the previous turn are visible to all. The score of
the active player in the previous round is shown on the left side of the panel. (D) Game screen showing the total score for each
player at the end of practice rounds.
Game design
We developed an interactive game played in groups of four
participants using tablet computers linked via a mobile hotspot.
The game was designed within Netlogo (Wilensky 1999), a multi-
agent modeling environment, and adapted from NonCropshare,
a coordination game for insect-based ecosystem services (Bell et
al. 2013, 2016; Appendix 2). We incorporated both temporal and
spatial dynamics: (1) resource availability at a given time t is
dependent on decisions made previously (e.g., animal number
decreases with killing effort), and (2) crop damage depends on the
location or proximity of cropland to other land uses as well as
neighboring farmers’ decisions (e.g., elephants are moving across
the landscape, and intensive scaring in one farm might displace
the problem elsewhere). These spatial and temporal dynamics
positively influenced the game’s realism.  
Game-play involves four participants (each representing one
household) who make decisions on a digital farming landscape.
Each participant acts on nine cells arranged in 3 × 3 contiguous
square blocks (Fig. 2). Each game session consisted of six to eight
rounds, intended to represent agricultural years. Communication
between participants was permitted in all the sessions to mirror
the conditions in which real-life incentive schemes operate. In each
round, there were four options available to participants in each
cell: (1) farm, (2) farm and scare elephants off  the cell using non-
lethal methods (e.g., physical or biological barriers, noise), (3)
farm and shoot elephants in the cell (lethal control), or (4) lease
the cell for elephant conservation (i.e., provide habitat for
elephants). Each option had different costs and benefits and was
assigned different parameter settings (Fig. 3).  
At the start of each round, the default option on all 36 grid cells
is farmland. Eighteen elephants are randomly distributed across
the landscape cells with equal probability. Multiple elephants per
cell are permitted. In each round, players select an option by
tapping repeatedly on the cell and end their turn by “confirming”
their choices when they are ready (Fig. 2). Damage occurs
immediately on a cell if  an elephant is present in a cell and is
neither scared nor killed. If  elephants are scared from a given cell,
they reorient to other cells probabilistically based on cell weights.
Elephant habitat cells have the highest weight and are nine times
more likely to accommodate elephants chased from other cells
than are farmed cells (Fig. 3). These habitats were described as
buffer resources providing alternative food sources for elephants.
However, providing elephant habitat means foregoing private
yield for benefits shared by all four players, creating a public good
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dilemma. Scaring and killing have an immediate effect in the same
round (e.g., if  an elephant is killed, no damage is incurred) as well
as a future effect because there are fewer elephants in future
rounds (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Game parameters.
The minimum value score per cell is set to zero to avoid unrealistic
negative values. Elephants left on any given cell decrease yield by
2 points. A habitat neighborhood effect is added to the game
settings to reflect the likely increase in crop damage in farmlands
that surround elephant habitats (Fig. 3). Similarly, non-lethal and
lethal control methods are not equally effective: scaring displaces
elephants with a probability of 0.8, and lethal shooting
immediately removes elephants from the landscape with a
probability of 0.3. Shooting costs much more than scaring to
reflect the higher risks and dangers involved in killing elephants,
as well as the costs of cartridges and guns. Killing systematically
results in a lower payoff for any player given its lower cost-
effectiveness ratio (0.3/2 vs. 0.8/1 for scaring; see Fig. 3), thus
making it a dominated strategy in a one-shot game (i.e., shooting
earns a player a smaller payoff than some other strategy,
regardless of what others do; see Appendix 3 which provides a
detailed explanation of the theory underlying the game design).  
Participants’ overall score on their set of n = 9 squares each round
is calculated as: 
(1)
  
The parameter values (Fig. 3) were chosen to reflect the local
social-ecological systems underpinning human–elephant interactions
in Gabon, and their plausibility was carefully pre-tested with local
farmers. For instance, losing 50% of the crop yield value to
elephant damage was observed in similar contexts (Mackenzie
and Ahabyona 2012).
Data collection
Each game session began with a short practice session of three
rounds followed by four randomly ordered treatments of six to
eight rounds each (Table 1). We thus used a within-subjects design
with 65 groups (260 participants) per treatment. The number of
rounds was randomized to prevent participants from anticipating
the conclusion of the treatment.



















None 1 2 0
Support for
deterrent
0 0 0 0
Flat-rate
subsidy
2, 4, or 6† 1 2 0
Agglomeration
payment








†Subsidy values were randomly selected at the start of the game and kept
constant for the remainder of the experimental session.
We conducted 65 game sessions with 260 household farmers, of
which 140 households were in conservation-influenced villages
(N = 8), and 120 households were in logging-influenced villages
(N = 10). Because of the low number of households within each
village in the two study areas (2–30 households per village), we
did not randomly select participants but instead invited all willing
participants present in each village to participate in our study.
Only one representative per household was invited to participate
in the games and was preferably the person responsible for most
agricultural activities; in most cases, this person was female.  
Games were facilitated in April and May 2018 by two teams of
two people each (including the lead author), randomly assigned
to groups of four participants. The game instruction protocol (in
French) was extensively piloted in nearby villages in February and
March 2018 (Appendix 4). The research ethics committee of the
University of Stirling approved this study. We told participants
that results would be presented in aggregate form and would not
be linked to their identity or the individual villages. We gained
verbal informed consent from all participants before
implementing the games. We dedicated sufficient time to the
practice rounds before starting the treatments to ensure sufficient
comprehension and to gain participants’ trust. The use of images
and verbal explanations allowed accessibility to illiterate or
innumerate participants (< 5% of participants; see Table A.1.2 in
Appendix 1). The practice rounds lasted 30–60 min, and the whole
game lasted 1.5–2.5 h. We offered gift items (e.g., a torch, food
containers, and cutlery, amounting to $8 USD in total) to
compensate participants for their time. Daily wages in the area
were approximately $6 USD.  
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We also administered a questionnaire survey to all participants
(N = 260) after the games to collect information on demographics,
farming practices, losses to wildlife, and attitudinal variables on
trust and equity (see Rakotonarivo et al. 2021a for the full survey
and anonymized data). To understand motivations for broad
decision strategies in the game, we further conducted unstructured
individual debriefing interviews with 30 participants immediately
upon completion of the game sessions and questionnaire survey.
Interviewees were selected purposively, based on our observations
of behavior in the game. We continued surveys until we believed
that we had interviewed participants that had used the full
spectrum of participant strategies in the games, i.e., those who
engaged frequently in lethal control, those who mostly resorted
to using non-lethal deterrents, and those who exhibited varying
levels of willingness to provide elephant habitats. The interviews
lasted 20–40 min and were not audio-recorded given the sensitive
nature of the data (particularly crop losses to elephants and
retaliatory killing by villagers, which is illegal). Instead, we took
notes and direct quotes where appropriate to aid the
contextualization of the game outcomes and provide additional
insights into the participants’ stated motivations (Anderies et al.
2011).
Data analysis
We examined two main game outcomes measured at the
individual household level (i.e., household unit): use of lethal
control (i.e., kill decisions), and provision of elephant habitats.
These outcomes draw from a larger number of actions (farm, kill,
scare, provide habitat) and represent two diametrically opposed
strategies in mitigating elephant crop damage. They are thus
particularly relevant to the exploration of responses to conflict
interventions.  
We modeled these outcome variables as proportion data
(proportion of cells with kill decisions or with habitat provided,
respectively) using binomial generalized linear mixed-effect
models with logit link function implemented within the lme4
statistical package (Bolker et al. 2009). Household identity was
included as a nested random effect within group identity to
account for household-specific and group-specific effects. We
controlled for learning by including four game conditions: (1)
rounds in the game, (2) rounds into session, (3) sum of kill
decisions of the three other participants in the previous round
(lagged kill decisions), and (4) sum of habitat decisions of the
three other participants in the previous round (lagged habitat
decisions).  
To relate behavior in the game to the trust and equity attitudes,
we included three explanatory variables in addition to the
treatments and game conditions: (1) one aggregated measure of
interpersonal trust among local communities, (2) one aggregated
measure of institutional trust (trust toward conservation and
government authorities), and (3) one aggregated measure of
equity indices. Each of these aggregated measures is the weighted
factor scores of three variables generated from exploratory factor
analyses with the psych statistical package using oblimin rotation
(Revelle 2018; Tables A1.1a–c in Appendix 1). The Chronbach’s
alpha (Tables S1a–S1c) indicated strong internal consistency and
showed that these aggregated measures were valid indicators of
a single underlying factor. We also included participants’
perceptions of the positive and negative effects of elephants on
their well-being.  
To explore the associations between game outcomes and real-life
farming practices and regions, we included as explanatory
variables households’ reported experiences of crop losses
(whether any of their fields had been damaged by elephants in
the previous agricultural year) and the study location. In addition,
we controlled for other socioeconomic variables such as
participant age, gender, education, and two principal component
vectors of a range of household wealth indicators extracted from
a principal component analysis (PCA) using the psych package
and promax rotation (Revelle 2018; Fig. A1.1 in Appendix 1). We
also considered two-level interactions between the treatments and
other household-related variables such as reported experiences of
crop losses, and participant-related variables such as perceptions
of elephants, trust, and equity indices. Table A1.2 (Appendix 1)
provides a detailed summary of the explanatory variables
included in our models.  
To avoid multicollinearity, we checked for correlations between
predictor variables. Model selection was then carried out using
backward stepwise selection of fixed effects based on the
corrected Akaike Information Criterion (AICc) value. We
conducted all analyses in R version 3.5.1 (R Core Team 2018).
RESULTS
Household socioeconomic and participant attitudinal
characteristics
On average, 47% of the surveyed households relied on agriculture
as the primary source of income in both study sites (Table A1.2
in Appendix 1). Of the 140 and 120 households sampled in
conservation-influenced villages and logging-influenced villages,
respectively, 69% and 55% had received at least one visit by
elephants in the previous agricultural year and experienced crop
damage (Table A1.3 in Appendix 1). Of the affected households,
68% and 54% reported significant crop losses (> 60% of annual
crops; Table A1.3 in Appendix 1). On average, participants had
six years of schooling, and 95% were literate. Food security, as
measured by the mean number of months per year for which
families reported having enough to eat, was 7.6 (standard
deviation [SD] = 3.6) and 8.5 (SD = 3.3) in the conservation-
influenced and logging-influenced villages, respectively. The PCA
of 10 measures of wealth resulted in two axes that explained 46%
of the variation and revealed no systematic differences between
the two groups of villages in terms of wealth (Table A1.3 and Fig.
A1.1 in Appendix 1). These two axes were used as covariates in
the statistical analyses using generalized linear mixed-effect
models along with other key socioeconomic characteristics (Table
2).  
Participants generally reported negative attitudes on key equity
indices. The share of participants who felt able to influence
decision-making regarding land use and wildlife management was
< 13% in both village groups (Fig. 4). Most participants (> 88%)
in both regions also perceived inequitable distribution of benefits
among community members, as well as unbalanced conservation
and development policy (Fig. 4). More than one-half  of
participants reported little trust toward governmental
organizations such as the National Agency for National Parks
and the Ministry for Water and Forests (Fig. 4).
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Table 2. Odds ratio estimates from the reduced generalized linear
mixed model showing the effect of treatments and other fixed
effects on farmers’ propensity to kill elephants in the games.
Individuals and groups were included as random effects.
 
Proportion of kill decisions




Support for deterrents 0.83*** 0.75–0.92
Subsidy 0.73*** 0.66–0.81
Agglomeration 0.58*** 0.51–0.65
Rounds into session 0.99*** 0.98–0.99
Total number of elephants in the landscape 1.03*** 1.02–1.05
Region ID (conservation-influenced villages) 0.36*** 0.22–0.60
Lagged kill decisions of other participants 1.06*** 1.04–1.08
Equity index 0.74** 0.59–0.93
Positive well-being effects of elephants 0.88** 0.80–0.96
Support for deterrents × equity index 1.19** 1.05–1.36
Subsidy × equity index 1.10 0.96–1.26








Marginal R²/conditional R² 0.071/0.423
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
The interviews revealed that although local farmers in the study
areas have faced crop damage for generations, crop losses to
elephants are perceived by some to have escalated after the former
Wildlife Reserve (created in 1946) became a National Park in
2002. Nine of thirty interviewees believed this escalation was
because of increased enforcement of the protected status of
elephants. Five interviewees in the logging-influenced villages also
blamed logging concessions for the increasing crop damage
incidents in the region. Logging activities were perceived to
disturb forest and push elephants to the periphery where farmers
farm. These feelings have fueled resentment toward the park and
other government entities. The interviews also uncovered that the
park agency role was perceived by some participants as strictly
repressive. Two interviewees articulated that the park agency’s
only purpose was to tighten control over wildlife. Nevertheless,
41% and 39% of surveyed households in conservation-influenced
and logging-influenced villages, respectively, had positive trust
attitudes toward the park agency (Fig. 4), mostly because of their
dedication to protect elephants, which are considered Gabon’s
national pride.  
If it were not for the park agency’s actions, Gabon’s
elephants would have gone extinct, and we appreciate
their efforts. (ID04, 31-year-old female, park village). 
Proxies for community trust were high (> 55%) in both study sites
(Fig. 4). Approximately 40% of surveyed farmers (41% and 39%
in conservation-influenced and logging-influenced villages,
respectively) perceived positive effects of elephants on their well-
being (Fig. 4). These benefits were mostly described as pertaining
to the roles of elephants in ecosystems, as well as their cultural
importance. The share of participants who perceived negative
effects of elephants on their well-being was 79% in both village
groups, mostly because of crop losses.
Effect of game treatments and household characteristics on
farmers’ predisposition to kill elephants
All three treatments significantly decreased farmer propensity to
engage in killing compared to the control in the game (Figure
A1.2 in Appendix 1); the agglomeration treatment had the greatest
effect, reducing the odds for killing by 42% compared to the
control in the main-effect- only model (Table A1.4 in Appendix
1). Participants with a higher equity index were significantly less
likely to engage in killing; for a one-unit increase in equity index,
the model suggested a 21% decrease in the odds of kill decisions
(odds ratio 0.79, 0.95 confidence interval [CI]: 0.63–0.98; Table
A1.4 in Appendix 1).  
In the final model (Table 2), we observed a significant interaction
between the treatments and equity indices; higher equity values
significantly weakened the effects of the deterrent and
agglomeration treatments in reducing farmers’ decisions to kill.
Kill decisions were significantly higher in the logging villages than
in the conservation villages (the odds for the former were 64%
higher; Table 2). Likewise, positive perceptions of the well-being
effects of elephants decreased participants’ propensity to engage
in killing (odds ratio 0.89, 0.95 CI: 0.80–0.98). Trust indices did
not affect participants’ decisions in the game (Table A1.4 in
Appendix 1). Similarly, neither farmers’ experiences of crop losses
(as measured by whether their farms had been damaged at least
once by elephants) nor the perceived negative effects of elephants
on their well-being affected game decisions (Table A1.4 in
Appendix 1). These results were insensitive to alternative model
specifications testing for the effect of elephant visit frequency or
whether affected households have experienced high damage.  
At lower equity levels, The effect of treatments on farmers’
propensity to kill were much more pronounced at lower than at
higher equity levels, as were the differences between the
conservation-influenced and logging-influenced villages (Fig. 5).
The predicted mean proportion of kill decisions in the baseline
treatment was almost two times higher in logging-influenced
villages than in conservation-influenced villages at the low equity
level (7.6%, 0.95 CI: 5.2–10.8 vs. 3.1%, 0.95 CI: 2.2–4.1,
respectively). However, at the higher equity level, discrepancies
among treatments became negligible, and the effect of
conservation vs. logging villages was also much smaller (Fig. 5).  
The qualitative interviews highlighted that most participants (23
of 30) felt they had very little opportunity to voice their views and
concerns (Fig. 4). Their predisposition to killing in the game was
as much to express their discontent as about protecting crops.  
The authorities are not clearly interested in listening to
our needs. If we are aggressive towards elephants, it is
because we feel abandoned, we are angry. (ID56, 56-year-
old male, logging village). 
Nevertheless, farmers recognized the value of elephants and
anchored their killing behavior in the game on the need to control
their number, not to eradicate them altogether. Such rationale was
also evidenced by the negative association between kill decisions
and farmers’ perceptions about the positive effects of elephants
on their lives (Table 2).  
To test the robustness of our inferences, we fitted additional
models testing each variable of interest one at a time. These
models suggest that the magnitude and statistical significance of
three key variables (equity index, region, and perceptions of the
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Fig. 4. Diverging stacked-bar charts of attitudinal trust and equity. (A–C) Statements were based on “Not at all” to “Very much”
Likert scales. (D–K) Statements were based on “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. CP = conservation-influenced villages, LV =
logging-influenced villages.
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positive effects of elephants on well-being) were robust to
alternative specifications (Table A1.7 in Appendix 1).
Fig. 5. Predicted proportions (%) of farmers’ decisions to kill
elephants in the conservation and logging villages under three
levels of equity. Predicted values computed from the reduced
model (Table 2) are shown for the average household and
group. Error bars are 0.95 quantiles of the bootstrapped
distributions.
Effect of game treatments and household characteristics on
farmers’ predisposition to provide habitats for elephants
Only the two monetary treatments generated a substantial
increase in decisions to create elephant habitat across rounds
compared to the baseline treatment. The percentage of habitat
decisions was the highest under the agglomeration treatment
(Figure A1.2 in Appendix 1). Agglomeration had the greatest
effect on habitat decisions (with an odds ratio of 12.97, 1.8 times
greater than that of subsidy, 0.95 CI: 11.18–15.05; Table 3). The
predicted percentages of habitat decisions in the agglomeration
and subsidy treatments were 21% (0.95 CI: 16–23) and 12% (0.95
CI: 11–14), respectively (Fig. 6).  
The deterrent treatment had no significant effect on farmers’
willingness to provide habitats (Table 5). The interviews suggested
a nuanced account of farmers’ motives for these results. The
erection of electric fences was used as an illustration of external
support for deterrents in the game instructions. Although
participants were generally positive about the potential effect of
such technology in reducing elephant crop damage, fencing
around parks or designated conservation areas was perceived by
10 interviewees as more effective than fencing farmlands.  
Hungry elephants will inevitably breach the fences; if not,
they will come around our houses and feed on our fruit
trees and gardens. The only solution is to keep them far
away. (ID32, 34-year-old female, conservation village). 
The maintenance costs of the community fences and a fair sharing
of these costs among village members if  government funds are
ever withdrawn were also concerns for these interviewees. In the
logging villages, participants foresaw space and soil fertility as
major limitations of the fences.
Fig. 6. Predicted proportion (%) of farmers’
decisions to provide habitats in each treatment.
Predicted values computed from the reduced
model (Table 3) are shown for the average
household and group. Error bars are 0.95 quantiles
of the bootstrapped distributions.
Table 3. Odds ratio estimates from the reduced generalized linear
mixed model showing the effect of treatments and other fixed
effects on farmers’ propensity to provide habitats in the games.
Individuals and groups were included as random effects.
 
Proportion of habitat decisions






Rounds into session 1.03*** 1.02–1.03
Total number of elephants in the
landscape
1.07*** 1.05–1.08










Marginal R²/conditional R² 0.293/0.562
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
Varying subsidy levels had no significant effects on the
percentages of kill decisions made or habitats provided (Table
A1.6, Fig. A1.3 in Appendix 1). The interviews corroborated such
findings; eight interviewees felt that they could use any help with
their livelihoods.  
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You cannot say no to money; the amount does not really
matter when you do not have many choices. Anyway, we
have already started giving up on farming because we can
no longer fight elephants; entire villages are disappearing
here, we are left on our own. (ID16, 62-year-old female,
conservation village). 
None of the socioeconomic or attitudinal covariates significantly
affected decisions to provide habitats (Table A1.5 in Appendix 1).
Effect of other game conditions on game outcomes
At the treatment level, we did not observe any significant learning
effect for both outcomes (as shown by the odds ratios of the
“round in the game” variable in Tables 2 and 3). However, as
participants played more rounds into the entire game session, they
were less likely to kill and more likely to provide habitats for
elephants (although the effect size was relatively small, odds ratio
= 0.99, 0.95 CI: 0.98–0.99 and 1.02, 0.95CI: 1.02–1.03 for
decisions to kill and provide habitats, respectively). Also, the
decisions of other participants in previous rounds significantly
affected the two outcomes, leading to higher kill and habitat
decisions, other things being equal. This result indicates that
participants took cues from the previous round and were more
likely to use a strategy that others used. Higher numbers of
elephants in the landscape also led to higher percentages of kill
and habitat decisions.
DISCUSSION
Predictors of farmer land-use decisions
We examined the effects of deterrent support and financial
incentives on farmer decisions using a temporally and spatially
dynamic game. We found that monetary payments significantly
increased local farmers’ decisions to provide designated areas for
elephants and decreased their propensity to use lethal methods.
The agglomeration treatment that pays individual households for
the provision of contiguous habitats had the greatest effect on
farmers’ behavior. Our results differ from those of Liu et al.
(2019), who reported mixed findings on the performance of an
agglomeration bonus in an auction setting among forest
landowners in rural China.  
Our study provides robust quantitative evidence that directly links
equity issues (e.g., the degree to which local people perceive that
they are involved in decision-making processes) with their
behavior in the game. We found that farmers’ propensity to engage
in killing is significantly reduced by more positive perceptions of
equity indicators. Another key finding is that killing behavior is
also strongly predicted by whether local people perceive positive
effects of elephants on their well-being (such as the critical role
of elephants in ecological processes). Neither material losses that
farmers had incurred from elephant crop damage nor their
socioeconomic characteristics affected their game decisions. In
addition, the odds of killing behavior (in the games) were 64%
higher in the logging villages than in villages influenced by
conservation management policies (i.e., close to National Parks),
although the rates of elephant encounters and crop damage were
lower in the former (55% have experienced crop damage in
previous agricultural year in logging villages compared to 69% in
conservation villages). These results highlight the need to extend
conflict interventions beyond protected areas. Because there were
no significant differences in trust and equity perceptions between
the two groups, these results could be explained by lower
environmental law enforcement further from national parks or
more positive attitudes toward conservation among participants
in the conservation-influenced villages.  
Unlike previous studies (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini 2000,
Handberg and Angelsen 2019), we found that increasing subsidy
levels in the monetary treatments did not generate a positive
response in habitat provision. The interviews suggested that some
farmers felt unable to negotiate compensations or to participate
effectively in decision-making processes. There seems to be an
urgent need for any forms of recognition of the considerable costs
that farmers incur from elephant crop damage, as documented
elsewhere in Africa (Noga et al. 2018).
Games as tools to predict and manage conservation conflicts
The results presented here are from a game rather than pilot or
real-world interventions, and despite our efforts to encourage
participants to state their true preferences, we cannot guarantee
that they are accurate reflections of the complexity of human–
elephant interactions. Thus, our findings might not correspond
with how participants would behave in real life (Roe and Just
2009, Jackson 2012). In particular, the value parameters (Fig. 3)
used in the games, such as the relative weight of different land
uses and the scale of crop damage by elephants, might not
perfectly mirror elephant behavior (Mumby and Plotnik 2018).
However, although our game settings were necessarily simplified,
they were perceived by participants as a safe and realistic decision-
support tool to voice their preferences and needs. The
incorporation of the temporal dimension and animal movements
also enhanced motivation and plausibility. Studying such a
sensitive topic with conventional methods is often difficult (Nuno
and St. John 2015), but the game provided a relaxed atmosphere
to explore local farmers’ propensity to engage in lethal control.  
Although our incentive structure differed from common practices
in experimental economics (rewarding players based on their
scores), there is precedence in the experimental literature for being
flexible with the incentive structure to ensure compatibility with
local concerns (e.g., Bell et al. 2015, Meinzen-Dick et al. 2016,
Rakotonarivo et al. 2021b). Our priority was to create a safe sphere
for participants to engage fully and state their preferences for
various interventions. We also wanted to avoid participants’
fixation on the rewards (Hur and Nordgren 2016) and were careful
not to introduce monetary rewards in a sensitive and emotionally
charged context such as human–elephant conflicts.  
We also draw upon qualitative data to validate and contextualize
our results; the discussions that followed the games gave critical
insights into the game behavior and suggested that the game was
salient to participants. A follow-up question asking participants
about their main goal in the games further suggested that 180
participants (69%) aimed to maximize their utility by playing as
in real life (Fig. A1.4 in Appendix 1). By better understanding
how farmers, and not a perfectly rational Homo economicus, make
decisions when facing different options, we are better able to
understand what drives people’s decisions and uncover novel
solutions invisible to conventional tools such as questionnaire
surveys (Murnighan and Wang 2016).
Implications for managing conservation conflicts
There is increasing evidence that incentive-based instruments that
are directly linked to conservation objectives can be valuable tools
for encouraging human–wildlife coexistence (Dickman et al.
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2011, Nyhus 2016). Our findings suggest that incentive-based
instruments are conducive to pro-conservation behavior.
Performance payments for habitat provision can be made
contingent on wildlife populations by rewarding farmers for
wildlife species inventoried in these habitats. Such a mechanism
has been successfully trialed in other countries such as Scotland,
where farmers are paid to maintain and feed protected geese on
their lands (McKenzie and Shaw 2017). Likewise, in Sweden,
farmers are paid for each certified lynx and wolverine in village
grazing lands (Zabel and Holm-Müller 2008). Incentive-based
instruments might also outperform the damage compensation
approach by reducing issues of “moral hazards” prevalent in
compensation schemes whereby farmers increase the likelihood
of crop losses (Ravenelle and Nyhus 2017).  
Nevertheless, monetary incentives might suffer from many of the
same problems faced by compensation schemes, such as the timing
of payments and determining the appropriate payment level
(Hanley et al. 2012). Monitoring might also be challenging where
there is an issue of scale and mobility, especially when schemes
involve large mammals. Real-time monitoring technology such as
GPS collars and drones that provide near-instantaneous
observation of animals can help to address these challenges (Wall
et al. 2014, but see Shrestha and Lapeyre 2018, who discuss the
drawbacks of using modern technologies).  
In the context of Gabon, where rural exodus and low rural
population density have considerably weakened agricultural
production (Fairet et al. 2014) and where wildlife habitat
availability is not a concern, incentivising the allocation of more
lands to elephants might not be appropriate. Instead, because our
findings show that positive perceptions of the well-being effects
of elephants can reduce farmers’ propensity to kill, redistributing
financial incomes from national parks to local development might
help to increase local support for conservation and have a greater
effect on pro-conservation behavior (McDermott et al. 2013).
National government strategies such as the Gabonese National
Park Agency management plan include the provision of benefits
to surrounding communities through tourism revenues and direct
financial aid leveraged from conservation funding (Leduc et al.
2016). Interviewed participants, however, felt that the
effectiveness of these revenues is limited.  
Our study further shows that conflict interventions in rural Gabon
are more likely to succeed where levels of social equity are higher.
Our findings imply that conflict interventions might also be more
effective if  they seek ways and means of addressing social equity.
For instance, beyond the current focus on reducing elephant crop
damage, greater involvement of communities in decision-making
processes would help to build trust toward conservation agencies
and build genuine receptivity to, and ownership of, conflict
interventions (Madden and McQuinn 2014, Hill et al. 2017, Noga
et al. 2018). Such ownership, in turn, can help to foster community
commitment to maintain technological deterrents such as electric
fences in the long term. Stakeholder engagement that leads to
genuine participation can be achieved by developing dialogue
(Redpath et al. 2017), by building local people’s capacity and
abilities to negotiate their needs (McDermott et al. 2013), or by
empowering local people in leadership roles during decision-
making and implementation processes (Madden and McQuinn
2014). Because equity concerns are complex and evolving
(Dawson et al. 2018), efforts to engage local stakeholders will also
need to be adaptive and sustained over time.
Conclusion
We used a dynamic interactive game framed around farmer land-
use decisions to examine farmer responses to conflict
interventions such as support for elephant deterrent techniques
and innovative economic instruments. Our findings suggest that
incentive-based payments are conducive to pro-conservation
behavior, and agglomeration schemes will achieve the greatest
conservation outcomes. Our study also shows that positive
perceptions of social equity can advance the acceptability of
conflict mitigation strategies. Our findings imply that addressing
the material manifestations of such conflicts might not tackle
underlying social conflicts; conflict interventions might be more
effective if  they also address social equity. The strong regional
differences in elephant killing behavior further highlight the need
to extend conflict interventions beyond protected areas.
Interactive games such as the one we describe here offer a low-
risk tool for testing novel approaches to understanding,
managing, and, where possible, preventing conservation conflicts.
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Figure A1.1: Indicators of wealth. Principal Component Analysis plots showing a) loadings of measures of wealth 
and b) individual scores with a convex hull for each study area. Wealth axis 1 represents consumer gods such as 
freezer, phone TV and cooking materials while wealth axis 2 distinguishes between households with more 
rooms, more livestock and those who have access to a large field (as opposed to gardens)  
 
 
Figure A1.2: Distribution of observed percentages of decisions to kill and to provide habitats in each treatment 
and round, across households and groups. Solid black bars represent the median proportion, boxes the 





Figure A1.3: Distribution of observed percentages of decisions to kill and to provide habitats per subsidy level 
across households and groups. Solid black bars represent the median proportion, boxes the interquartile range 
and error bars extend to 1.5 times the IQR limits. 
 
 
Figure A1.4: Follow-up question asking participants about their main goal in the game 
 
Table A1.1a: Factor loading of the interpersonal community trust indices 
 One-factor solution  
“Most of the time, people in my community are 
mostly trying to help each other” 
0.76 
“Generally speaking, most people in my community 
are honest and can be trusted” 
0.61 
“In general, people in my community lend money to 
each other when needed, and get the money they 
have lent back” 
0.61 
Proportion of variance explained = 0.44, Cronbach's alpha = 0.70 





Table A1.1b: Factor loading of the institutional trust indices 
 One-factor solution  
Trust in the National Park Agency 0.81 
Trust in the Ministry of Water and Forests 0.88 
Trust in the Ministry of Agriculture 0.70 
Proportion of variance explained = 0.64, Cronbach's alpha = 0.84 
SS loadings = 1.92, Correlation of (regression) scores with factors   0.93, Root mean square of residuals 
(RMSE) = 0 
 
Table A1.1c: Factor loading of the equity indices  











Proportion of variance explained = 0.45, Cronbach's alpha* = 0.70 
SS loadings = 1.34, Correlation of (regression) scores with factors = 0.87, Root mean square of residuals 




Table A1.2: Socio-economic and attitudinal variables included in the models 
Variables Description Summary statistics 
(N=260) 
Region ID Binary variable indicating whether a household was surveyed 







Numeric variable representing the weighted factor scores from 
three measures of institutional trust (trust towards the Park 
agency, the Ministry of Water and Forests and the Ministry of 
Agriculture; figure S1; Cronbach's alpha* = 0.84, the one-factor 




Community trust index Numeric variable representing the weighted factor scores from 
three measures of trust among local communities; figure S1; 
Cronbach's alpha* = 0.70, the one-factor solution explained 




Equity  Numeric variable representing the weighted factor scores from 
three measures of equity among local communities (Equitable 
government policy, perceived influence on decision-making 
and equitable distribution of benefits; figure S1; Cronbach's 






impacts of elephants 
Numeric variable indicating the households’ perceptions of the 
positive impacts of elephants on well-being (figure S1) 
Mean -2 
Std. dev. 2 
Mean 1.2 
Negative well-being 
impacts of elephants 
Numeric variable indicating the households’ perceptions of the 
positive impacts of elephants on well-being (measured on a 
Likert scale of -2 to +2) (figure S1) 
Mean -2 




Binary variable indicating whether a household has 





Binary variable indicating whether a household’s primary 
occupation is agriculture 
Yes 
117 (47%) 
Age Numeric variable indicating the age of the participant Mean 42.6 
Std. dev. 15 
Median 42 
Gender Categorical variable (two categories in our data, so treated as 
binary) indicating the gender of the participant  Male 96 (36%) 
Education Numeric variable indicating the years of official schooling of 
the participant 
Mean 6.1 
Std. dev. 3 
Median 6 
* Cronbach's alpha is a measure of internal consistency or scale reliability, i.e. how closely related a set of items 






Table A1.3: Socio-economic characteristics of surveyed households 












Crop damage Whether the household has 
experienced any damage by 
elephant for the past 12 months 
(in any of their fields) 
69.2 % Yes 55 % Yes NA 
Magnitude of 
crop damage 
Whether crop losses by elephant 
were high (damage > 60%) (for 
households who have 
experienced crop damage) 
68% Yes 54.5% Yes NA 
Frequency of 
elephant visit 
Numeric variable indicating the 
number of crop-raiding incidents 




Std. dev.: 3.3           
Median: 1.0 
Mean: 2.5 
Std. dev.: 3.8           
NA 
Food security Number of months for which HH 
has 
enough to eat  
Median: 9.0 
Mean: 7.6 
Std. dev.: 3.6            
Median: 10  
Mean: 8.5 







Numeric variable indicating total 
livestock owned by the 
household in tropical livestock 




Std. dev.: 0.28           
Median: 0.00 
Mean: 0.16 






Materials used by the 











15% = Stove, 
11%: Four-





and stove = 
2, Stove=3, 
Four-flame 
oven = 4) 
Number of 
rooms 
Total number of rooms Median: 4, 
Mean: 5.5,  
Std. dev.: 4.0           
Median: 4, 
Mean: 4.7,  
Std. dev.: 3.4           
Continuous 
variable 
Floor quality Type of floor in the primary 
dwelling 





Whether households have 
access to a large field 
50% Yes 63% Yes Access to a 
large field 
(0=No, 1=Yes) 
Refrigerator Number of refrigerators owned 
by the household  
Median: 0.0 
Mean: 0.17 
Std. dev.:    0.41       
Median: 0.0 
Mean: 0.12 
Std. dev.: 0.35     
Continuous 
variable 




Std. dev.: 0.66          
Median: 1.0 
Mean: 0.68 
Std. dev.: 0.76          
Continuous 
variable 




Std. dev.: 0.65           
Median: 1.0 
Mean: 0.64 





Mobile phone Number of mobile phones 
owned by the household 
Median: 1.0 
Mean: 1.27 
Std. dev.: 0.74          
Median: 1.0 
Mean: 1.07 





Table A1.4: Odds ratio estimates from the full GLMM model showing the effect of treatments and other 
households’ characteristics on farmers’ propensity to kill elephants in the games. Random effects included in the 
model were individuals and groups. 
  Proportion of kill decisions 
Predictors Odds Ratios 95 % CI 
(Intercept) 0.09 *** 0.03 – 0.24 
Deterrents 0.81 *** 0.73 – 0.90 
Subsidy 0.72 *** 0.64 – 0.80 
Agglomeration 0.57 *** 0.50 – 0.64 
Rounds in the game 0.97  0.93 – 1.00 
Rounds into session 0.99 *** 0.98 – 0.99 
Lagged kill decisions of other participants 1.05 *** 1.03 – 1.08 
Total number of elephants in the landscape 1.02 * 1.00 – 1.04 
Region ID (conservation-influenced villages) 0.36 *** 0.22 – 0.59 
Equity index 0.73 ** 0.58 – 0.93 
Community trust index 1.13  0.91 – 1.41 
Institutional Trust index 1.04  0.85 – 1.27 
Positive well-being impacts of elephants 0.88 * 0.79 – 0.97 
Negative well-being impacts of elephants 1.01  0.87 – 1.16 
Experienced crop damage 0.76  0.51 – 1.13 
Primary occupation: Agriculture 1.03  0.68 – 1.53 
Wealth axis 1 1.20  0.97 – 1.48 
Wealth axis 2 1.07  0.87 – 1.31 
Age 0.99  0.98 – 1.01 
Gender 0.98  0.66 – 1.46 
Education 1.01  0.94 – 1.08 
Support for deterrents * Equity index 1.18 * 1.03 – 1.35 
Subsidy * Equity index 1.04  0.90 – 1.20 
Agglomeration * Equity index 1.25 ** 1.08 – 1.44 
τ00 1.29 HHID:GameID 
 0.51 GameID 
Observations 4976 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 0.082 / 0.406 
 
 
Table A1.5: Odds ratio estimates from the full GLMM model showing the effect of treatments and other 
households’ characteristics on farmers’ propensity to provide habitats in the games. Random effects included in 
the model were individuals and groups. 
  Proportion of habitat decisions 
Predictors Odds Ratios 95% CI 
(Intercept) 0.00 *** 0.00 – 0.01 
Deterrents 1.00  0.85 – 1.17 
Subsidy 7.29 *** 6.37 – 8.35 
Agglomeration 12.97 *** 11.18 – 15.05 
Rounds in the game 0.98  0.96 – 1.01 
Rounds into session 1.03 *** 1.02 – 1.03 
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Lagged habitat decisions of other participants 1.07 *** 1.06 – 1.07 
Total number of elephants in the landscape 1.07 *** 1.04 – 1.09 
Region ID (conservation-influenced villages) 0.85  0.55 – 1.30 
Equity index 1.01  0.81 – 1.26 
Community trust index 0.92  0.73 – 1.16 
Institutional Trust index 1.06  0.86 – 1.32 
Positive well-being impacts of elephants 1.00  0.90 – 1.12 
Negative well-being impacts of elephants 0.99  0.85 – 1.15 
Experienced crop damage 1.11  0.74 – 1.65 
Primary occupation: Agriculture 0.91  0.60 – 1.38 
Wealth axis 1 0.96  0.78 – 1.18 
Wealth axis 2 0.86  0.70 – 1.06 
Age 1.00  0.98 – 1.01 
Gender 1.45  0.97 – 2.17 
Education 1.03  0.96 – 1.10 
τ00 1.84 HHID:GameID 
 0.15 GameID 
Observations 4976 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 0.302 / 0.568 
 
Table A1.6: Effects of subsidy levels and other game conditions on kill and habitat decisions (only the monetary 
treatments were included in the model). For categorical variables the level that is represented by the intercept 
term is shown in parentheses. 
  Proportion of kill decisions Proportion of habitat decisions 
Predictors Odds Ratios 95% CI Odds Ratios 95% CI 
(Intercept) 0.02 *** 0.01 – 0.04 0.03 *** 0.02 – 0.06 
Treatments (Subsidy)     
Agglomeration 0.78 *** 0.69 – 0.88 1.93 *** 1.78 – 2.10 
Subsidy level (2)     
Subsidy level 4 0.87  0.54 – 1.43 0.83  0.55 – 1.27 
Subsidy level 6 0.94  0.48 – 1.84 1.09  0.63 – 1.86 
Rounds in the game 0.98  0.93 – 1.04 0.98  0.95 – 1.01 
Rounds into session 0.99 * 0.98 – 1.00 1.04 *** 1.03 – 1.05 
Lagged kill decisions of other 
participants 
1.07 *** 1.03 – 1.10   
Lagged habitat decisions of other 
participants 
  1.06 *** 1.04 – 1.07 
Total number of elephants in the 
landscape 
1.05 ** 1.02 – 1.09 1.06 *** 1.03 – 1.08 
Random Effects 
Variance 1.61 HHID:GameID 2.42 HHID:GameID 
 0.96 GameID 0.43 GameID 
Observations 2580 2580 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 0.009 / 0.444 0.076 / 0.505 
* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table A1.7: Robustness tests: Odds ratio estimates from three GLMM models showing the effect of treatments 
and three variables of interest (1: Equity, 2: Region ID, 3: positive well-being impacts of elephants) on farmers’ 
propensity to kill elephants in the games. Random effects included in the model were individuals and groups. 
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  Proportion of kill 
decisions (1) 
Proportion of kill 
decisions (2) 









(Intercept) 0.04 *** 0.02 – 0.06 0.06 *** 0.04 – 0.10 0.03 *** 0.02 – 0.05 
Deterrents 0.84 ** 0.76 – 0.94 0.83 *** 0.75 – 0.93 0.83 *** 0.75 – 0.93 
Subsidy 0.75 *** 0.67 – 0.83 0.74 *** 0.66 – 0.83 0.74 *** 0.66 – 0.83 
Agglomeration 0.59 *** 0.52 – 0.67 0.58 *** 0.52 – 0.66 0.58 *** 0.52 – 0.66 
Equity index 0.73 ** 0.58 – 0.92 
    
Rounds 0.97 0.93 – 1.00 0.97 0.93 – 1.01 0.97 0.93 – 1.01 
Rounds into the session 0.99 *** 0.98 – 0.99 0.99 *** 0.98 – 0.99 0.99 *** 0.98 – 0.99 
Lagged kill decisions of 
other participants 
1.05 *** 1.03 – 1.08 1.05 *** 1.03 – 1.07 1.05 *** 1.03 – 1.07 
Total number of elephants 
in the landscape 
1.02 * 1.00 – 1.04 1.02 * 1.00 – 1.04 1.02 * 1.00 – 1.04 
Support for deterrents * 
Equity index 
1.19 ** 1.05 – 1.36 
    
Subsidy * Equity index 1.10 0.96 – 1.26 
    
Agglomeration * Equity 
index 
1.26 *** 1.10 – 1.45 




0.36 *** 0.22 – 0.60 
  
Positive well-being impacts 
of elephants 
    
0.86 ** 0.79 – 0.95 
Random Effects 
τ00 1.45 HHID:GameID 1.46 HHID:GameID 1.40 HHID:GameID  
0.88 GameID 0.61 GameID 0.87 GameID 
Observations 5156 5156 5156 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 0.016 / 0.424 0.057 / 0.421 0.023 / 0.422 
* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
 
Appendix 2. NOTES ON THE NETLOGO FRAMEWORK 
Netlogo is a coding language that specialises in agent-based-modelling but can also be successfully used 
to implement field experiments, as we demonstrated. Its interface was very user-friendly, and it readily 
allowed the incorporation of the spatial and temporal dynamics. The NetLogo framework also allowed 
us to create a mobile lab in the field – giving us the benefits of a computational framework (capturing 
nonlinear outcomes in the landscape) without introducing the selection bias inherent in bringing people 
to a computer lab (those that can give up more time and drive out to join you).  As well, the structure of 
NetLogo and HubNet mean that it was easy to get tablets to send signals to each other reliably in field 
conditions, change languages easily, and sub in visual cues in place of text. Plea see Bell (2013) and Bell 
and Zhang (2016) for more information. 
 
Bell, A., & Zhang, W. (2016). Payments discourage coordination in ecosystem services provision: 
evidence from behavioral experiments in Southeast Asia. Environmental Research Letters, 
11(11), 114024. Retrieved from http://stacks.iop.org/1748-9326/11/i=11/a=114024 
Bell, A., Zhang, W., Bianchi, F., & vander Werf, W. (2013). NonCropShare -  a coordination game for 
provision of insect-based ecosystem services. (http://ifpri.org/ publication/noncropshare-
coordination-game) (Accessed: 19 June 2016).  
 
Appendix 3 - THEORY UNDERLYING THE GAME DESIGN 
Introduction  
Game theory provides the foundation for predicting the decisions of rational agents in strategic 
situations. For simple games, it is often possible to find strategic solutions in which no agent can 
benefit by changing their strategy (i.e., Nash equilibria). But where the possible strategy space of a 
game is very large (e.g. if optimal play is contingent upon dynamic local conditions such as resource 
distribution or game history), analytical solutions are often intractable (Hamblin 2013). To ensure 
sufficient realism and motivations for play, our treatments model many elephants moving 
independently and stochastically among spatially explicit landscape cells, and we allow for the 
decisions of current rounds to potentially affect payoffs in future rounds (e.g. shooting elephants 
subsequently reduces their number). While this critical game realism precludes us from deriving 
analytical solutions for optimal play, it is possible to derive analytical solutions for simplified 
conditions (e.g. a single round of game play and expected elephant distribution), and to explore the 
consequences of dominant (though not necessarily optimal) strategies (such as “always scare when 
elephants are on a cell, else farm”) that might be used in game play. 
Stakeholders in our games needed to consider the discrete movement of elephants on a spatially 
explicit landscape, while simultaneously considering how current decisions might affect future 
payoffs. Under such complex conditions, considering the full range of possible strategies available to 
players is not tractable, nor would it be particularly useful for understanding actual stakeholder 
decision making in our behavioural games. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to relate the behavioural 
games being played back to first principles of game theory. In this supplementary material, we 
analyse a simplified version of the behavioural game from the main text and demonstrate that while 
farming all landscape cells is a Nash equilibrium, cooperative play to build elephant habitats can 
ultimately lead to higher payoffs if the temptation to defect can be avoided. We also show the 
payoffs associated with heuristic strategies played when elephant distributions are discrete across 
the landscape, and when shooting elephants can have long-term consequences on accrued payoffs 
in late rounds of the behavioural game. Finally, we show all R code used to analyse Nash equilibria. 
This supplementary material is organised as follows. 
1. Nash equilibria for simplified game 
2. Issues arising from elephant distributions 
3. Issues arising from sequential rounds 
4. Supporting code: Annotated functions 
In the first section, we consider a game played for a single round, and given expected (i.e., 
probabilistic) rather than realised elephant distributions. 
Nash equilibria for simplified game 
A Nash equilibrium is a stable state of strategies for a game, from which no invading strategy can 
outperform the resident strategy, hence any individual player performs best by adopting the 
resident strategy. Below, we have developed code that allows the user to place three identical 
resident strategies on the simulated game landscape for any set of game parameter combinations. 
The test_fitness function then iterates every possible invading strategy and checks its fitness against 
the fitnesses of the resident strategy. It does this by simulating the player in the upper right corner 
of the game landscape (note that due to landscape symmetry, choice of landscape quadrant               
does not matter). In the elephant games, players can choose from four possible options for each of 





Each option is associated with points, a cost, and a weight that affects the cell’s attractiveness to 
geese (and those of neighbouring cells). There are 4! = 262144 possible combinations of farm, 
scare, cull, and habitat choice on the nine cells. Hence, to test whether or not a resident strategy can 
be invaded by a different strategy, we cycle through all 262144 possible land use choice 
combinations that could possibly invade the resident strategy     . If none of these combinations 
results in a higher payoff than the resident strategy (i.e., if the best invading strategy is the resident 
strategy), then we have proved through exhaustive search that the resident strategy is a Nash 
equilibrium for the chosen game conditions. 
The key simplifying assumption we make in assessing Nash equilibria is that payoffs are calculated 
from the expected distributions of elephants (based on landscape cell weights) rather than realised 
distributions of individual elephants. For example, on a landscape in which all cells are being farmed 
and therefore of equal weight and probability of elephant occurrence     , each cell is assumed to 
have 18/36 = 0.5 elephants. Where different land-use decisions are made, expected elephant 
numbers are adjusted accordingly by cell weights. This simplification preserves the general structure 
of the game and allows us to investigate it from first principles using game theory. Allowing instead 
for realised elephant distributions would make calculation of Nash equilibria using our method 
intractable, as there are 36"# ≈ 1.03 × 10$# possible ways that 18 elephants can be distributed 
across the landscape (although this number could be reduced somewhat by identifying symmetries 
on the landscape). It would also likely result in complex strategies, conditional upon realised 
elephant distributions; we explore such strategies in the following section. 
The test_fitness function works by iterating through all possible invading strategies and calculating 
the payoff of each. If the background strategy is a Nash equilibrium, then the highest payoff score 
will also be the background strategy. All parameter values are included as arguments, which are 








kill Elephant habitat 
Yield 4 4 4 0 
Subsidy 0 0 0 X [2, 4, 6] 
Crop damage (per 
elephant) 
-2 -2 -2 0 
Costs 0 -1 -2 0 
Weight 10 5 2 90 





None None +5 weight to neighbour 
cells 
The parameter values in the table above are set as default arguments in the function test_fitness() 
function, which is shown below. 
test_fitness <-  function(land, 
                          farm_points      = 4, 
                          scare_points     = 4, 
                          cull_points      = 4, 
                          habitat_points   = 0, 
                          farm_cost        = 0, 
                          scare_cost       = 1, 
                          cull_cost        = 2, 
                          habitat_cost     = 0, 
                          farm_weight      = 10, 
                          scare_weight     = 5, 
                          cull_weight      = 2, 
                          habitat_weight   = 90, 
                          bump             = 5, 
                          habitat_neigh    = 1, 
                          eleph_count      = 18, 
                          damage           = 2, 
                          scare_prob       = 0.8, 
                          cull_prob        = 0.3, 
                          shoot_to_kill    = TRUE, 
                          replace_living   = FALSE 
){ 
    parameters <- c(farm_points, scare_points, cull_points, habitat_points, 
                    farm_cost, scare_cost, cull_cost, habitat_cost, 
                    farm_weight, scare_weight, cull_weight, habitat_weight, 
                    bump, habitat_neigh, eleph_count, damage, 
                    scare_prob, cull_prob, shoot_to_kill, replace_living); 
    perms      <- expand.grid( c1 = 1:4, c2 = 1:4, c3 = 1:4, c4 = 1:4, c5 = 1:4, 
                               c6 = 1:4, c7 = 1:4, c8 = 1:4, c9 = 1:4); 
    tot_perms  <- dim(perms)[1]; 
    fit_vector <- rep(0, tot_perms); 
     
    time_elapsed <- proc.time(); 
    for( strat in 1:tot_perms ){ 
        temp_l            <- land; 
        temp_l[1,4]       <- perms[strat,1]; 
        temp_l[1,5]       <- perms[strat,2]; 
        temp_l[1,6]       <- perms[strat,3]; 
        temp_l[2,4]       <- perms[strat,4]; 
        temp_l[2,5]       <- perms[strat,5]; 
        temp_l[2,6]       <- perms[strat,6]; 
        temp_l[3,4]       <- perms[strat,7]; 
        temp_l[3,5]       <- perms[strat,8]; 
        temp_l[3,6]       <- perms[strat,9]; 
        temp_l            <- unlist(temp_l); 
        land              <- matrix(data = temp_l, nrow = 6, ncol = 6);  
        land_pay          <- calc_payoff(land, parameters); 
        strat_fitness     <- sum(land_pay[1:3, 4:6]); 
        fit_vector[strat] <- strat_fitness; 
        time_check        <- proc.time(); 
        time_print        <- time_check - time_elapsed; 
        if(time_print[3] > 30){ 
            pct_complete <- round(strat / tot_perms * 100); 
            print(paste("Progress: ", pct_complete, "%", sep = "")); 
            time_elapsed <- proc.time(); 
        } 
    } 
     
    output <- list(strategy = perms, fitness = fit_vector, land = land); 
     
    return( output ); 
} 
Note that the test_fitness function relies on the custom function calc_payoff to calculate the payoff 
of a focal strategy (i.e., the payoff of a focal set of land-use decisions, as played in the upper right 
corner of the landscape), which in turn calls several other custom functions. These custom functions 
are explained in detail below, but here it is only important that calc_payoff calculates the payoff of a 
focal invading strategy against a selected resident strategy. The loop in the above cycles through 
every possible invading strategy to calculate all possible payoffs. In the output of test_fitness, the list 
of strategies is returned (strategy), along with the fitness of each strategy (fitness; vector elements 
correspond to rows of strategy), and the original landscape (land). 
Resident farming strategy: To show that farming on all cells is a Nash equilibrium, it is first necessary 
to define a landscape as a six by six matrix in which the background strategy land-use choices are 
being played. For farming, cell land use choice takes a value of 1, so the appropriate land is simply a 
matrix of 1s. 
proposed_NE <- matrix(data = 1, nrow = 6, ncol = 6); 
##      [,1] [,2] [,3] [,4] [,5] [,6] 
## [1,]    1    1    1    1    1    1 
## [2,]    1    1    1    1    1    1 
## [3,]    1    1    1    1    1    1 
## [4,]    1    1    1    1    1    1 
## [5,]    1    1    1    1    1    1 
## [6,]    1    1    1    1    1    1 
The land matrix is then used in the test_fitness function, where all the payoffs of all possible 
invading strategies are compared to the payoffs of the resident strategy. 
fitness_results <- test_fitness(land = proposed_NE); 
These results are then summarised with the following function fitness_summary. 
fitness_summary <- function(results, background = NULL, plot = FALSE){ 
    if(is.null(background) == TRUE){ 
        background <- matrix(data = 1, nrow = 3, ncol = 3); 
        warning("No resident strategy selected: assuming all farming"); 
    } 
    fitness   <- results$fitness; 
    strategy  <- results$strategy; 
    land      <- results$land; 
    fit_order <- order(fitness, decreasing = TRUE); 
    top_ten   <- fit_order[1:10]; 
    payoff    <- fitness[top_ten]; 
    most_str  <- strategy[top_ten,]; 
    res_tabl  <- cbind(payoff, most_str); 
    bgstrat   <- unlist(t(background)[1:9]); 
    permpos   <- 1; 
    checkstr  <- 0; 
    time_elapsed <- proc.time(); 
    while(checkstr == 0 & permpos < dim(strategy)[1]){ 
        sqrdev <- (bgstrat - strategy[permpos,])*(bgstrat - strategy[permpos,]); 
        if( sum(sqrdev) == 0 ){ 
            checkstr <- 1; 
        }else{ 
            permpos <- permpos + 1;     
        } 
        time_check        <- proc.time(); 
        time_print        <- time_check - time_elapsed; 
        if(time_print[3] > 10){ 
            pct_complete <- round(permpos / dim(strategy)[1] * 100); 
            print(paste("Checked: ", pct_complete, "%", sep = "")); 
            time_elapsed <- proc.time(); 
        } 
    } 
    last_row <- c(fitness[permpos], bgstrat); 
    res_tabl <- rbind(res_tabl, last_row); 
    rownames(res_tabl) <- c("Strategy 1", "Strategy 2", "Strategy 3", 
                            "Strategy 4", "Strategy 5", "Strategy 6", 
                            "Strategy 7", "Strategy 8", "Strategy 9",  
                            "Strategy 10", "Resident Strategy"); 
    if(plot == TRUE){ 
        par(mar = c(5, 5, 1, 1), lwd = 2); 
        hist(fitness, xlab = "Strategy Fitness", ylab = "Frequency", 
             main = "", cex = 1.5, cex.lab = 1.5, cex.axis = 1.5, col = "grey"); 
    } 
    return(res_tabl); 
} 
The function fitness_summary organises the results from test_fitness and generates an ordered list 
of invading strategies by fitness. If the highest fitness strategy is the resident strategy, then it will be 
the first listed in the table and the resident strategy will be a Nash equilibrium. The fitness_summary 
argument background is for the user to set what the equivalent ‘resident’ strategy looks like for the 
invader. The reason that the background strategy is not just assumed to be identical to the other 
three players is because an ‘identical’ strategy might actually rely on symmetry in land orientation – 
e.g., if everyone farms all their squares except the square in the middle of the board. 
inv_bgd <- matrix(data = 1, nrow = 3, ncol = 3); 
results <- fitness_summary(results    = fitness_results,  
                           background =  inv_bgd); 






















1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 2 26.68
879 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 3 26.68
879 
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 4 26.68
879 
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 5 26.68
879 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 6 26.68
879 
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 7 26.68
879 
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Strategy 8 26.68
879 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Strategy 9 26.68
879 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Strategy 10 26.68
879 





1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
The payoff is indicated in the second column, while c1 through c9 refer to the invading strategy’s 
landscape cells ordered by row as below in table form. 
##      [,1] [,2] [,3] 
## [1,]    1    2    3 
## [2,]    4    5    6 
## [3,]    7    8    9 
Given that the highest fitness strategy is the resident strategy of farming on all cells, with a total 
payoff of 27, we can say that farming on all cells is a Nash equilibrium strategy; if all neighbours are 
farming all of their cells, then the best strategy a focal player can have is to also farm all cells. 
It is important to note that just because farming on all cells is a Nash equilibrium, this does not mean 
that farming on all cells also yields the highest payoff per player. Indeed, we can show using the 
same method that a cooperative strategy replacing farming with elephant habitat in each player’s 
centre-most landscape cell yields a higher payoff for each player. Consider the landscape below, and 
recall that 4 indicates the choice of elephant habitat. 
##      [,1] [,2] [,3] [,4] [,5] [,6] 
## [1,]    1    1    1    1    1    1 
## [2,]    1    1    1    1    1    1 
## [3,]    1    1    4    4    1    1 
## [4,]    1    1    4    4    1    1 
## [5,]    1    1    1    1    1    1 
## [6,]    1    1    1    1    1    1 
The above cooperative resident strategy yields more than 27 points, but is not a Nash equilibrium. 
To demonstrate this, the below code is run as before. 
proposed_NE_coop           <- matrix(data = 1, nrow = 6, ncol = 6); 
proposed_NE_coop[3:4, 3:4] <- 4; 
fitness_results_coop       <- test_fitness(land = proposed_NE_coop); 
inv_bgd_coop               <- matrix(data = 1, nrow = 3, ncol = 3); 
inv_bgd_coop[3, 1]         <- 4; # Habitat in the lower left corner 
results_coop               <- fitness_summary(results    = fitness_results_coop,  
                                              background = inv_bgd_coop); 






















1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 2 30.14
320 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Strategy 3 29.80
237 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 4 29.80
237 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Strategy 5 29.72
078 
1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 
Strategy 6 29.72
078 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
Strategy 7 29.63
195 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 8 29.63
195 
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 9 29.63
195 
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 10 29.63
195 





1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 
While the total payoff of the resident strategy has increased slightly to 27.5 from 27 when all players 
were farming, this cooperative use of elephant habitat is not a Nash equilibrium because the highest 
payoff strategy is still farming, which now yields an even higher payoff of 30.25. Hence, when the 
game is analysed for a single round of play given payoffs of expected elephant distributions, it entails 
a classic Prisoner’s dilemma situation in which rational play by all agents leads to a lower payoff than 
would be possible through cooperation. 
Resident scaring strategy: Interestingly, if the resident strategy is such that all farmers scare 
elephants on all cells, then the most successful invading strategy is one that scares on every cell 
except one, in which elephant habitat is instead provided. Using the same techniques as above, the 






















2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 
Strategy 2 18.69
544 
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Strategy 3 18.54
265 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 
Strategy 4 18.48
862 
2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Strategy 5 18.47
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2 2 1 2 2 2 4 2 2 
Strategy 6 18.47
838 
2 1 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 
Strategy 7 18.47
838 
1 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 
Strategy 8 18.45
241 
2 2 2 2 2 1 4 2 2 
Strategy 9 18.42
327 
2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 1 
Strategy 10 18.40
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2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
As noted above, the top scoring strategy yields a payoff of 18.7138156, which is higher than the 
resident strategy of 16.1681998, meaning that scaring on all cells is not a Nash equilibrium, and can 
be invaded by a player who opts to set one landscape cell aside for elephant habitat. Interestingly, 
this strategy of scaring on all landscape cells, except for a centre-most cell, is also not a Nash 
equilibrium, but can itself be invaded by a strategy of scaring on only one cell and farming on the 
rest. The total payoff accrued to each player increases, and it is worth noting that most of the 






















1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Strategy 2 27.18
349 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 3 27.04
452 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
Strategy 4 27.03
048 
1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 
Strategy 5 26.88
839 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Strategy 6 26.87
459 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 7 26.82
997 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 
Strategy 8 26.82
295 
1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 
Strategy 9 26.82
295 
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 
Strategy 10 26.81
441 
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In the above, the background and highest fitness strategy has a payoff of 27.2982609, slightly higher 
than the payoff accrued to one player when all players farm. Nevertheless, this highest fitness 
strategy in the example above is also vulnerable to invasion, this time from our originally considered 






















1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 2 25.99
745 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Strategy 3 25.99
745 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Strategy 4 25.99
745 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Strategy 5 25.99
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2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 6 25.99
247 
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 7 25.99
247 
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 8 25.99
247 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 9 25.99
247 
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Strategy 10 25.99
247 





1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Hence, by induction, it is clear that a community of players who scare elephants on all cells is prone 
to eventual replacement by a community of farmers. A strategy in which all players scare on all cells 
will be invaded by a strategy in which one player scares on all but one cell (leaving elephant habitat 
in their centre-most cell), which in turn will be invaded by a strategy of farming all but one cell 
(scaring elephants in their centre-most cell), which will finally be invaded by a strategy of farming on 
all cells. The same occurs for a community of players who shoot elephants on all cells, which (like 
uniform scaring) can also be invaded by a strategy of scaring on all but one cell. 
Resident shooting strategy: When the resident strategy is to shoot on all landscape cells, the highest 























2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 
Strategy 2 20.64
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4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Strategy 3 20.64
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2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 
Strategy 4 20.56
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2 1 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 
Strategy 8 20.56
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1 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 
Strategy 9 20.38
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2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Strategy 10 20.25
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Hence shooting on all cells is not a Nash equilibrium, while the strategy of providing habitat on one 
(central) cell and scaring on all of the rest is surprisingly robust. 
Summary: We have proven through exhaustive search that farming all landscape cells is a Nash 
equilibrium in a single round of the game described in the text given expected elephant distributions 
(i.e., where the cost of an elephant on each cell is determined by the expected number of elephants 
on the cell). We have also demonstrated that a cooperative strategy allocating at least one 
landscape cell to elephant habitat yields a higher payoff for each player, but that this cooperative 
strategy can be invaded by a selfish strategy that only farms. Finally, we have shown that strategies 
of scaring or shooting elephants on all landscape cells are vulnerable to invasion by strategies that 
are more farming-focused. The important outcome of this exercise is to show that the theoretical 
foundation of the complex elephant game played among stakeholders in the main text is grounded 
by the classic situation in which rationally acting agents will play a selfish strategy despite 
cooperative play yielding a higher total payoff. 
Using the functions test_fitness and fitness_summary, it can additionally be shown that scaring, 
killing, or placing elephant habitat on all cells are not Nash equilibria, with all being invaded by a 
‘farm all cells’ strategy. Hence, for the simplified game structure, it is always best for a rational agent 
to farm all of their cells. It is important to emphasise that such a strategy is not necessarily rational 
once the assumption of expected elephant distribution is relaxed and elephants are allowed to vary 
stochastically across the landscape. In this case, due to chance, discrete elephants will appear on 
some cells and not others, and with a probability that is proportional to cell weights. Players will 
therefore need to decide what to do when they are faced with one or more elephants on specific 
cells but not others. In this case, the number of possible ways that 18 elephants can be distributed 
across 36 landscape cells makes calculating the payoff consequences of different strategies for each 
possible elephant distribution intractable. Further, given this level of game complexity, it is highly 
unlikely that real human players will play completely rationally, so it is more useful to consider the 
consequences of heuristic strategies that yield high payoffs. We do this in the next section. 
Issues arising from elephant distributions 
When elephants are placed discretely on the landscape, and therefore have discrete by-cell effects 
on crop loss rather than expected effects proportional to their probability of occurring on a given 
landscape cell, game players must decide what to do with elephants found on specific cells. Rational 
strategies in this case will likely not correspond to specific land-use choices on landscape cells, but 
rather decisions about what to do upon observing 𝜖 elephants on a given landscape cell; this 
decision might be affected by the strategies of other players and the distribution of elephants on 
other players’ lands. 
Recall that the minimum cell payoff is 0, elephants are randomly and uniformly distributed across 
landscape cells, and multiple elephants per cell is permitted. In a single round of game play, scaring 
and shooting actions take immediate effect. There are two heuristic strategies that are especially 
worth considering, which we define as ‘scare-on-cells’ and ‘shoot-on-cells’. In the scare-on-cells 
strategy, players scare on any cell containing at least one elephant, but otherwise farm. In the shoot-
on-cells strategy, players shoot on any cell containing at least one elephant, but otherwise farm. 
Below, we discuss the consequences of each strategy for a single round of game play. 
The scare-on-cells strategy. The scare-on-cells strategy is likely a useful heuristic for playing the 
elephant game. Elephants on a landscape cell reduce the payoff yielded from the cell by 2 (𝛥). 
Scaring elephants comes with a cost (𝐶%&'()) of 1 and has a 0.8 probability of success. It therefore 
comes with a potential increase in payoff of 1 if there is one elephant on the cell and 3 if there are 
two or more elephants on the cell. In the case of a single elephant, all else being equal, the 
probability that the elephant will be scared onto one of the focal player’s remaining 8 cells (thereby 
negating the benefit of the action) is roughly 0.23. Using this value, the probability of scaring to a cell 
of a neighbouring player is therefore 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑) ≈ 0.8 × (1 − 0.23) ≈ 0.616. In other words, this 
is the probability that by scaring on a cell, the elephant leaves the cell and does not return to a 
different cell on the focal player’s landscape. All else being equal, the expected number of points 
accrued from scaring on a cell with 𝜖 elephants is as follows, 
𝐸%&'()(𝜖) = 𝑌 − 𝐶%&'() − 𝛥𝜖(1 − 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑)).	
In the above, 𝑌 is the yield from farming on the cell. Verbally, the above therefore describes the 
payoff yield from farming, minus the cost of scaring, minus the damage of elephants after scaring. 
Scaring damage is calculated as the damage per elephant (𝛥), times the number of elephants (𝜖), 
times the probability that an elephant is not scared successfully (1 − 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑)). For a landscape 
cell containing a single elephant, expected yield is as follows, 
𝐸[𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒*+"] = 4 − 1 − 2(1)(1 − 0.616) = 2.232.	
Note that 𝐸[𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒*+"] = 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡%&'() = 3 when 𝜖 = 0, but as 𝜖 increases, the expected 
number of points accrued from scaring can actually become negative. Consider the instructive 
though highly unlikely case in which 𝜖 = 18 (i.e., all elephants are on a single cell). Because the 
minimum possible cell yield is 0, in such a situation it would be a better strategy to simply farm the 
cell or turn it into elephant habitat (both have a cost of 0) because scaring elephants on the cell risks 
dispersing all 18 of them to other cells and spreading the damage. The focal player is simply better 
off accepting the loss of the 3 potential yield from farming on a single cell (4 minus 1 for the cost of 
scaring) to ensure a yield of 4 on all of the remaining 8 cells, regardless of what other players are 
doing. 
For illustrative purposes, now assume that there exist 𝜖 elephants on a particular landscape cell of 
interest. Further assume that all other landscape cells are farmed, and that any other elephants on 
the landscape can be ignored for the purpose of predicting payoffs. We can consider how low 𝜖 
needs to be for scaring them to be beneficial for a focal player when all elephants are on a single 
cell. First, note that to expect to gain any points at all from the cell on which elephants are located 
(even ignoring 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡%&'(), and the possibility of elephants being displaced to a focal player’s other 
cells), it must be the case that 𝜖 < 10. When 𝜖 = 10, the number of elephants remaining on the cell 
is expected to be 2 (𝜖(1 − 0.8)), which would still result in the minimum possible crop yield of zero. 
When accounting for the cost of scaring and probability that scared elephants will return to one of 
the focal player’s own landscape cells, with the above equation, scaring is only expected to increase 
payoff when 𝜖 < 4. Values of 𝜖 ≥ 4 result in a negative 𝐸[𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒], meaning the action should not be 
taken (a higher payoff would be possible by farming the cell, or by turning it into elephant habitat). 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that 𝜖 ≥ 4 is highly unlikely, and that this situation was very rarely 
observed during behavioural games. 
Given that the realised number of elephants per landscape cell is rarely more than three, the 
heuristic strategy of scare-on-cells is generally a good one. In this case, all else being equal, scaring 
increases a focal player’s total payoff. Next, we will investigate the shoot-on-cells heuristic strategy 
in more detail. 
The shoot-on-cells strategy 
Shooting elephants potentially removes them from the entire landscape, thereby decreasing the 
total number of elephants that can subsequently decrease crop yield on a focal player’s landscape 
cells. But unlike scare-on-cells, a shoot-on-cells strategy is not very beneficial for a single round of 
play. The probability of successfully shooting an elephant is low (𝑃𝑟(𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑡) = 0.3), and from a focal 
player’s payoff perspective, completely removing the elephant from the landscape gives no more 
benefit than scaring it onto a neighbouring player’s cell. Because elephants are not displaced upon 
shooting, calculating the expected payoff for shooting an elephant on a landscape cell is relatively 
straightforward, 
𝐸[𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑡] = 𝑌 − 𝐶%,--. − 𝛥𝜖(1 − 𝑃𝑟(𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑡))	
In the above, 𝐶%,--. is the cost of shooting. For a landscape cell containing a single elephant, 
expected yield is as follows, 
𝐸[𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑡*+"] = 4 − 2 − 2(1)(1 − 0.3) = 0.6.	
In this case, the expected payoff of shooting the elephant is actually lower than simply farming the 
landscape cell; the cost of shooting is too high, and the probability of success is too low, for shooting 
to be worthwhile. When 𝜖 > 1, 𝐸[𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑡] = 0 regardless of whether farming or shooting is chosen 
(if farming, then elephant damage reduces crop yield to zero; if shooting, elephant damage is 
expected to reduce crop yield to 1.2, but the cost of shooting is an additional 2). Hence, shooting 
elephants is never beneficial in a single round of the game. In the next section, we will look at how 
the shoot-on-cells strategy can affect points accrued over the course of 6-8 rounds of play in 
behavioural games. 
Issues arising from sequential rounds 
In previous sections, we examined simplified versions of the behavioural game in the main text, 
either by using expected rather than realised spatial distributions of elephants, or by considering 
payoff consequences for a single round of game play. When players interact over multiple rounds of 
game play, the parameter space of possible strategies increases exponentially to include strategies 
that are conditional upon game history. These strategies could be dependent upon the actions of, 
and payoffs accrued by, one or more players over the course of previous game rounds (e.g., a 
strategy might be to act one way if some number of other players did something within the previous 
3 rounds, but act a different way if not). The complexity permitted in such strategies, and the 
consequent challenge of assessing their costs and benefits, is illustrated by the considerable amount 
of literature surrounding iterative strategies for the simple Prisoner’s dilemma game (Darwen and 
Yao 1995; Adami and Hintze 2013; Rapoport et al. 2015). We therefore cannot attempt a detailed 
assessment of even a fraction of the possible strategies of the behavioural games played in the main 
text. Instead, here we consider only the most obvious, and likely most influential, effect of game 
history on player strategies; when an elephant is shot, there is one fewer elephant to cause crop 
damage on the landscape for all subsequent rounds of play. 
Long-term gains of shooting of elephants 
Behavioural games are played over the course of 6-8 rounds. Given this constraint, we can predict 
how elephant number is expected to decrease if all players shoot elephants when elephants are 
observed on their landscape cells. The expected number of elephants in round 𝑟 + 1 is as follows, 
𝐸[𝜖(/"] = 𝜖((1 − 𝑃𝑟(𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑡))	
In the behavioural games, 𝑃𝑟(𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑡) = 0.3, and we can plot 𝐸[𝜖(/"] over rounds assuming that all 
players attempt to shoot elephants. 
 
Overall, we see an exponential decrease in elephant number. By round six (in which some games 
terminate), the combined efforts of four players reduce expected elephant number to 3.02526. An 
additional two rounds brings expected elephant number down to 1.4823774. This greatly reduces 
the potential for elephant damage on the landscape for later rounds, but the cost of shooting in 
each round also needs to be considered. In each round, the expected total cost of shooting across all 
players will be equal to twice the number of expected elephants (𝐶%,--. = 2), while the expected 
cost for a single focal player will be equal to half the number of expected elephants (assuming the 
expected distribution of elephants is uniform). If we restrict potential strategies to farming and 
shooting, we can calculate the expected payoff per player over time as elephant number decreases. 
 
To look at the benefit of shooting over rounds, we can compare the marginal benefit accrued from 
shooting (i.e., the increased payoff per player above the baseline expected if no shooting had taken 
place) to the accrued cost of shooting (i.e., the total amount spent over rounds on shooting). 
  
As indicated by the plot above, when all players are shooting elephants on their cells, the benefit of 
shooting will have outweighed the cost of shooting by round six. Any subsequent rounds 7-8 will 
lead to an even higher payoff associated with lower elephant number. The accrued benefit begins to 
outweigh      the cost of shooting because with each passing round, more farmed cell yields 
accumulate that would not have accumulated if elephants had not already been shot, and the cost 
of shooting also begins to drop as fewer elephants occupy landscape cells. In other words, the early 
decision by players to shoot elephants can payoff in later rounds because once elephants have been 
eliminated, yield can be collected in higher numbers with each passing round with less need to 
spend costs on shooting. Were games to continue for an indefinite number of rounds with this 
strategy, eventually all elephants would be eliminated, thereby increasing farm yield to its maximum 
per cell payoff for each cell, and eliminating the cost of shooting altogether (by eliminating the need 
to shoot). Hence, when round history is considered, long-term cooperative strategies of shooting can 
be beneficial. 
Note that the above estimate for when determining when sustained shooting becomes more 
beneficial than costly is conservative because sometimes more than one elephant will occupy a 
single cell. When this happens, the cost of shooting will be reduced by two times the additional 
number of elephants on the cell because the cost of shooting is accrued on a per cell basis, not a per 
elephant basis. Also note that the same long-term rationale for shooting applies to individual 
players, assuming that elephants are not scared onto focal player’s land. The expected per-player 
costs and benefits accrued over rounds will not change in this case because each player is expected 
to start with 4.5 elephants on their land. Relaxing this assumption, players that start with more 
elephants on their landscape will also accrue the long-term payoff benefits of shooting more rapidly 
than players that start with fewer elephants on their landscape cells. 
Supporting code: Annotated functions 
Here we list and explain all functions called by calc_payoff in the test_fitness function above, starting 
with calc_payoff itself. All functions are publicly available on GitHub. The calc_payoff function above 
refers to a function that calls other functions to calculate the payoff of an invading strategy. 
calc_payoff <- function(land, parameters){ 
    farm_points    <- parameters[1];  
    scare_points   <- parameters[2]; 
    cull_points    <- parameters[3]; 
    habitat_points <- parameters[4]; 
    farm_cost      <- parameters[5]; 
    scare_cost     <- parameters[6]; 
    cull_cost      <- parameters[7]; 
    habitat_cost   <- parameters[8]; 
    damage         <- parameters[16]; 
    eleps_distr    <- place_eleps(land, parameters); # Expected eleph number 
    eleps_distr    <- disturb_eleps(land, parameters, eleps_distr); 
    pay_mat        <- matrix(data = 0, nrow = dim(land)[1], ncol = dim(land)); 
    # Assign points to each landscape type 
    pay_mat[land < 4]    <- pay_mat[land < 4] - eleps_distr[land < 4] * damage; 
    pay_mat[pay_mat < 0] <- 0; 
    pay_mat[land == 1]   <- pay_mat[land == 1] + farm_points 
    pay_mat[land == 2]   <- pay_mat[land == 2] + scare_points 
    pay_mat[land == 3]   <- pay_mat[land == 3] + cull_points 
    pay_mat[land == 4]   <- pay_mat[land == 4] + habitat_points 
    pay_mat[land < 4]    <- pay_mat[land < 4]  - eleps_distr[land < 4] * damage; 
    pay_mat[pay_mat < 0] <- 0; 
    pay_mat[land == 1]   <- pay_mat[land == 1] - farm_cost; 
    pay_mat[land == 2]   <- pay_mat[land == 2] - scare_cost; 
    pay_mat[land == 3]   <- pay_mat[land == 3] - cull_cost; 
    pay_mat[land == 4]   <- pay_mat[land == 4] - habitat_cost; 
    return(pay_mat); 
} 
This calc_payoff() function reads in the relevant parameters and the places the elephants with the 
place_eleps function, disturbs them (for scaring and shooting strategies), then calculates the payoffs 
for the landscape given the expected distribution of elephants. Note that as in the actual 
behavioural game, effects of scaring or shooting take effect immediately, so an elephant on a cell at 
the beginning of a round might not cause crop damage to that cell if successfully scared or shot. 
Weights of the cells map linearly to the probability of an elephant landing on a cell, so the 
probability of an elephant landing on a cell is simply the cell’s weight divided by the total of all cell 
weights. This is seen in the place_eleps function. 
place_eleps <- function(land, parameters){ 
    eleph_count <- parameters[15];  
    weight_mat  <- assign_cell_weight(land, parameters); 
    weight_pr   <- weight_mat / sum(weight_mat); 
    exp_eleps   <- eleph_count * weight_pr; 
    return(exp_eleps); 
} 
The above function places elphants based on cell weight, which is assigned using the 
assign_cell_weight function below. 
assign_cell_weight <- function(land, parameters){ 
    bump       <- parameters[13];  
    rows       <- as.numeric(dim(land)[1]);  
    cols       <- as.numeric(dim(land)[2]); 
    weight_mat <- matrix(data = 0, nrow = rows, ncol = cols); 
    weight_mat[land == 1] <- parameters[9]; 
    weight_mat[land == 2] <- parameters[10]; 
    weight_mat[land == 3] <- parameters[11]; 
    weight_mat[land == 4] <- parameters[12]; 
    weight_mat            <- habitat_bump(land, bump, weight_mat); 
    return(weight_mat); 
} 
Note that each landscape option 1-4 is assigned its weight as defined in the parameters vector, then 
the habitat_bump function adjusts weights based on neighbourhood effects (i.e., if land == 4 
indicating elephant habitat, the weight of neighbouring cells increases). 
habitat_bump <- function(land, bump, weight_mat){ 
    # Early return if there's no reason to go through the ifs 
    habitats <- sum(land == 4); 
    if( habitats == 0 ){ 
        return(weight_mat); 
    } 
    rows          <- dim(land)[1]; 
    cols          <- dim(land)[2]; 
    for(row in 1:rows){ 
        for(col in 1:cols){ 
            if(land[row, col] == 4){ 
                neighbours <- get_neighbours(land, row, col); 
                neighbours[neighbours == 1] <- bump; 
                weight_mat <- weight_mat + neighbours; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    return(weight_mat); 
} 
The bump is added whenever a landscape cell equals 4 indicating elephant habitat, and this bump is 
added to all neighbours. The neighbours of a particular cell land[row, col] is found using the 
get_neighbours function. 
get_neighbours <- function(land, row, col){ 
    rows          <- dim(land)[1]; 
    cols          <- dim(land)[2]; 
    neighbour_mat <- matrix(data = 0, nrow = dim(land)[1], ncol = dim(land)); 
    if(row == 1){ 
        if(col == 1){ 
            neighbour_mat[1, 2] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[2, 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[2, 2] <- 1; 
        } 
        if(col == cols){ 
            neighbour_mat[1, col - 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[2, col]     <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[2, col - 1] <- 1;             
        } 
        if(col > 1 & col < cols){ 
            neighbour_mat[1, col - 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[1, col + 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[2, col - 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[2, col]     <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[2, col + 1] <- 1;  
        } 
    } 
    if(row == rows){ 
        if(col == 1){ 
            neighbour_mat[rows - 1, 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[rows - 1, 2] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[rows, 2]     <- 1; 
        } 
        if(col == cols){ 
            neighbour_mat[rows - 1, col]     <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[rows - 1, col - 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[rows, col - 1]     <- 1; 
        } 
        if(col > 1 & col < cols){ 
            neighbour_mat[rows, col - 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[rows, col + 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[rows - 1, col - 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[rows - 1, col]     <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[rows - 1, col + 1] <- 1;  
        } 
    } 
    if(row > 1 & row < rows){ 
        if(col == 1){ 
            neighbour_mat[row - 1, 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row + 1, 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row - 1, 2] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row, 2]     <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row + 1, 2] <- 1; 
        } 
        if(col == cols){ 
            neighbour_mat[row - 1, col]     <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row + 1, col]     <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row - 1, col - 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row, col - 1]     <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row + 1, col - 1] <- 1; 
        } 
        if(col > 1 & col < cols){ 
            neighbour_mat[row - 1, col - 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row - 1, col]     <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row - 1, col + 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row, col - 1]     <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row, col + 1]     <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row + 1, col - 1] <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row + 1, col]     <- 1; 
            neighbour_mat[row + 1, col + 1] <- 1; 
        } 
    } 
    return(neighbour_mat); 
} 
Loops are avoided in the above function to increase computational efficiency. An additional call to 
the place_eleps() function is used whenever elephants are scared or culled off of a cell to 
redistribute those displaced elephants 
disturb_eleps <- function(land, parameters, eleps_distr){ 
    starting_eleps <- parameters[15]; 
    scare_prob     <- parameters[17]; 
    cull_prob      <- parameters[18]; 
    replace_living <- parameters[20]; 
    rows           <- dim(land)[1]; 
    cols           <- dim(land)[2]; 
    for(row in 1:rows){ 
        for(col in 1:cols){ 
            if(land[row, col] == 2){ 
                eleps_on_cell         <- eleps_distr[row, col]; 
                stay_prob             <- (1 - scare_prob); 
                eleps_distr[row, col] <- eleps_on_cell * stay_prob; 
                parameters[15]        <- eleps_on_cell * scare_prob; 
                added_eleps           <- place_eleps(land, parameters); 
                eleps_distr           <- eleps_distr + added_eleps; 
            } 
            if(land[row, col] == 3 & parameters[19] == FALSE){ 
                eleps_on_cell         <- eleps_distr[row, col]; 
                stay_prob             <- (1 - cull_prob); 
                eleps_distr[row, col] <- eleps_on_cell * stay_prob; 
                parameters[15]        <- eleps_on_cell * cull_prob; 
                added_eleps           <- place_eleps(land, parameters); 
                eleps_distr           <- eleps_distr + added_eleps; 
            } 
            if(land[row, col] == 3 & parameters[19] == TRUE){ 
                eleps_on_cell         <- eleps_distr[row, col]; 
                stay_prob             <- (1 - cull_prob); 
                eleps_distr[row, col] <- eleps_on_cell * stay_prob; 
                culled                <- eleps_on_cell * cull_prob 
                parameters[15]        <- parameters[15] - culled; 
                starting_eleps        <- starting_eleps - culled; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    parameters[15] <- starting_eleps; 
    if(replace_living == TRUE){ 
        eleps_distr <- place_eleps(land, parameters); 
    } 
    return(eleps_distr); 
} 
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Appendix 4.  GAME PROTOCOL (TRANSLATED FROM FRENCH) 
[first set up the seating, preferably forming a circle, read consent form, record player names write 
their identifier codes on the score recording sheet, set up tablets, and put in player identifier] 
Hello, and thank you for being here today. 
Today we are going to play a game about land use decision making.  You’ll play in groups of four, and 
each player will have an equal share of the land in the game, a total of 9 squares. Your participation is 
voluntary but we would really appreciate if you stay for the full session as the game can’t run without 
all four participants.  
We are offering some gift items to thank you for your participation in today’s experiment which should 
take about 90-120 minutes. In addition, the content of the gift items will depend on your management 
decisions in the game, which we will explain in a moment.  
Do you consent to continue? If at any time you find that this is something that you do not wish to 
participate in for any reason, you are of course free to leave whether we have started the game or 
not. 
 
In each of those squares, you can do one of four things: 
1 2 3 4 
    
 
1. Farm the square for your private business 
2. Farm the square for your private business and use non-lethal deterrent methods to scare elephants 
away 
3. Farm the square for your private business and kill elephants found marauding on your farmlands 
4. Lease your farm plot for elephant conservation (zones dedicated to elephant conservation or” 
elephant habitat”). 
Each of the you will take responsibility for land use decisions on a 3x3 grid-cell section (farm) of a 6 x 
6 grid-cell agricultural landscape as shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure: Bottom left corner of the landscape is active player 
Each of these four options has different benefits and costs.  Let me introduce each of them in turn.  
Farming the square (options 1, 2 and 3) brings a yield of +4. Providing elephant habitats brings no 
yield. Non-lethal scaring brings a cost of -1 while lethal scaring costs -2.  These costs reflect both the 
materials, efforts, and also the risk associated with the illegal nature of these activities.  
We are going to play a few rounds per game session – rounds can be analogous to years. In each 
round, there are a certain number of elephants in the landscape. When elephants land on farmed cells 
(options 1, 2, 3), they cause damages and decrease your farm yield. This is described in the second 
line in the above figure (“elephant damage”), the amount of elephant damage on each farmed square 
depends on the number of elephants in that square. 
You don’t need to memorize this – you can use this sheet as a reference while you play the game 
[hand out sheet now]. 
At the start of each round, the default land use options on all 36 grid cells are farmlands (option 1). 
Elephants are randomly distributed across the landscape with an equal chance. If you decide to scare 
elephants on a given cell, then some will leave the cell and reorient in other cells based on the 
attractiveness of the three options. Elephant habitats (the forth option) is the most attractive option, 
that is elephants are much more likely to be drawn to an elephant square (option 1) than on your 
farmlands (options 1, 2, 3). These habitats contain some palatable crops and can therefore reduce 
agricultural damages across the landscape by drawing elephants from other places. However, 
elephant habitats may slightly increase the amount of elephant damage in farmlands that immediately 
surround them by bringing more elephants close to them in the landscape. However, rest assured that 
the neighbourhood effect of the habitat is small enough and may only marginally significantly affect 
the yield of adjacent farmlands. Put simply, elephant habitats may make things significantly better for 
some farms by keeping elephants at bay. 
The number of elephants at the start of each round equals 18 and decreases with lethal scaring efforts 
(the more you shoot, the less elephants there are left). Please note that non-lethal and lethal scaring 
techniques are not 100 % effective, just like in real life, so you may try to deter elephants, but they 
might still raid your farm, likewise, you may attempt to kill them, but some will survive. We have set 
the games so you will success at killing an elephant 8 out of 10 times, using deterrent techniques 
however only works 3 out of 10 attempts.  
In some of the game sessions that we are going to play today, a subsidy and/or bonus is given for every 
elephant habitat in the landscape. In another game session, the subsidy will offset the cost of the non-
lethal deterrent method, i.e. the cost of the non-lethal deterrent option (option 2) becomes zero. 
You can cycle through the choices for each square by clicking on the square itself, and we’ll practice 
that in a minute.  When you’ve decided, you can click ‘Confirm’ and wait for the other players to 
confirm. Once everyone has confirmed, the round is over and the “score” (i.e., the total points earned) 
is calculated for each cell based on your choices in and around the cell, and the process is repeated in 
the next round. 
You will be permitted a period of discussion (one minute) before you make your individual decisions 
at the beginning of each round. You will make decisions simultaneously on your land squares and 
will see at the end of each round what has happened across the whole landscape, what yields are 
achieved in each square, and what scores are earned by each player. Although you can observe 
individual players’ decisions, you won’t be able to match decisions to the individual.  
One other note – you can change any of the 9 squares to any of the two land use choices you like, in 
each round. 
So just to review, farming brings a yield of +4. Scaring techniques bring a cost of -1 or -2.  Elephant 
habitats bring no yield but they may decrease elephant damage across the landscape by keeping 
elephants away from farmlands.  
Let’s look now at the game screen and see how this all fits together. 
This is a screen shot from the first turn for Player 1, in the bottom left quadrant.  The identifiers of the 
other three players are shown over their quadrants, which are lighter in colour, and can’t be modified 
by Player 1. The white coloured number on each square is the number of elephants. 
 
 
Figure 2: Bottom left corner of the landscape is active player, actions taken by other players in 
previous turn are visible. 
 
[Note, we don’t show a sample here as we don’t wish to suggest any strategies] 
 
After I have finished the explanation we will play a short practice game to help you to understand 




We’ll just play a few short rounds now so that you get comfortable with the rules of the game. I’ll walk 
you through the first turn so you can see how it goes, and you can ask me questions during your turn 
or between rounds. I encourage you to use the practice session as an opportunity to explore different 
options and see what happens. Feel free to discuss with others, but please do keep your screen to 
yourself.  
 
[walk through a 4-round practice game] 
 
Got it?  [answer any follow-up questions] 
 
Ok, let’s move on to the experiment. 
 
We are going to play four different games, each one of which will differ a little bit, and might change 
a bit from what we’ve done in the practice. 
 
Now, as you make your decisions, we’d like you to maximize your utility (or “do well”) by trying to 
earn points, and that’s where the gift items come in.  At the end of the session, we’ll record the 
score for each player on the paper and pick one of the four games that you played randomly and 
look at the highest score. The gift items (content and number) that you will each receive equally will 
be based on that highest score.  
Please remember that there are different ways to earn points, either by playing individually or as a 
team working together. Most importantly, we want your decisions to reflect what you would do in 
real life. 
 
Ok, let’s begin. 
 
[Each game group will play 4 treatments; the order are randomised across groups. Thus, the four 
treatments can be introduced in a way that does not depend on other treatments having been played 
first. 
G1: Baseline treatment: 
In this game, the settings are just like they were in the practice. There is no subsidy from providing 
elephant habitats. You are allowed to discuss the game with the other players at the beginning of 
each round, but please keep your screen to yourself. This game will last at least 6 rounds. 
 
G2: Flat Rate Subsidy:  A subsidy from X points (drawn randomly at the beginning of the game and 
held constant during the game) 
In this game, you are being offered a subsidy for each square of land that you lease as elephant 
habitats. You’ll receive a subsidy which will add to your total score. You are free to discuss the game 
with other players at the beginning of each round, but keep your screen to yourself. This game will 
last at least 6 rounds. 
G3: Support for deterrents 
In this game, the settings are just like they were in the practice. There is no subsidy from leasing 
plots for elephants. However, you will get some support for deterring elephants from your 
farmlands, the support will offset the cost of non-lethal deterrent methods. You are allowed to 
discuss the game with the other players at the beginning of each round, but please keep your screen 
to yourself. This game will last at least 6 rounds. 
G4: Agglomeration payment  
In this game, you are being offered a subsidy for each square of elephant habitat in your land. You’ll 
receive a subsidy worth X points which will add to your total score. In addition, you will also get an 
additional bonus of 1 point for every elephant square that has at least one elephant square next to it. 
You are free to discuss the game with other players at the beginning of each round, but keep your 
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_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
1
0
 
W
h
a
t
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
y
 
d
o
i
n
g
 
a
w
a
y
?
 
(
1
=
S
t
u
d
y
,
 
2
=
W
o
r
k
,
 
3
=
O
t
h
e
r
s
 
(
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
)
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
1
1
 
D
o
 
t
h
e
y
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
h
o
s
u
e
h
o
l
d
'
s
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
r
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
?
 
(
1
=
I
n
c
o
m
e
,
 
2
=
E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
,
 
3
=
B
o
t
h
,
 
4
=
N
e
i
t
h
e
r
)
 
 
 
1
2
 
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
:
 
W
h
a
t
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
y
o
u
r
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
?
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
 
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
1
=
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
;
 
2
=
O
i
l
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
;
 
3
=
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
j
o
b
 
(
e
.
g
.
 
c
i
v
i
l
 
s
e
r
v
a
n
t
)
;
 
4
=
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
j
o
b
 
(
e
.
g
.
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
,
 
N
G
O
,
 
e
c
o
t
o
u
r
i
s
m
)
;
 
5
=
W
i
l
d
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
h
a
r
v
e
s
t
e
r
 
(
o
r
 
h
u
n
t
e
r
)
;
 
6
=
O
t
h
e
r
 
(
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
)
 
 
 
1
3
 
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
:
 
W
h
a
t
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
f
 
y
o
u
r
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
?
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
 
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
1
=
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
;
 
2
=
O
i
l
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
;
 
3
=
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
j
o
b
 
(
e
.
g
.
 
c
i
v
i
l
 
s
e
r
v
a
n
t
)
;
 
4
=
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
j
o
b
 
(
e
.
g
.
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
,
 
N
G
O
,
 
e
c
o
t
o
u
r
i
s
m
)
;
 
5
=
W
i
l
d
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
h
a
r
v
e
s
t
e
r
 
(
o
r
 
h
u
n
t
e
r
)
;
 
6
=
O
t
h
e
r
 
(
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
)
 
 
 
1
4
 
H
a
s
 
y
o
u
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
p
l
d
 
b
e
e
n
f
i
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
a
n
y
 
l
i
v
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
 
o
r
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
s
t
 
f
i
v
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
?
 
(
1
=
Y
e
s
,
 
0
=
N
o
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
 4 
C
.
 
F
a
r
m
i
n
g
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
:
 
L
a
n
d
 
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
,
 
l
a
n
d
 
u
s
e
 
a
n
d
 
w
i
l
d
l
i
f
e
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
 
 
 
1
 
P
l
e
a
s
e
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
n
d
 
t
h
a
t
 
y
o
u
 
h
a
v
e
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 
t
o
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
o
s
e
 
y
o
u
 
c
u
l
t
i
v
a
t
e
d
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
s
t
 
a
g
r
i
-
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
 
y
e
a
r
 
(
2
0
1
6
/
2
0
1
7
)
.
 
H
o
w
 
m
a
n
y
 
p
l
o
t
s
 
d
i
d
 
y
o
u
 
f
a
r
m
?
 
H
o
w
 
f
a
r
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
y
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
c
e
n
t
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
v
i
l
l
a
g
e
?
 
W
h
a
t
'
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
i
z
e
?
 
H
o
w
 
d
i
d
 
y
o
u
 
g
e
t
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
p
l
o
t
s
?
 
 
 
 
[
N
o
t
e
:
 
A
s
k
 
h
e
r
e
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
A
L
L
 
t
h
e
 
p
l
o
t
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
H
H
 
h
a
s
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 
t
o
 
a
n
d
 
c
a
n
 
c
u
l
t
i
v
a
t
e
.
 
F
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
l
o
t
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
w
e
r
e
 
c
u
l
t
i
v
a
t
e
d
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
s
t
 
r
e
c
e
n
t
 
a
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
 
y
e
a
r
)
,
 
a
s
k
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
 
t
h
e
 
(
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
)
 
a
r
e
a
,
 
e
i
t
h
e
r
 
i
n
 
h
a
 
(
m
2)
 
O
R
 
i
n
 
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
s
e
e
d
s
 
u
s
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
u
n
i
t
s
]
 
 
 
[
(
N
o
n
-
)
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
c
o
d
e
s
:
 
-
9
8
=
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t
 
D
O
E
S
 
N
O
T
 
K
N
O
W
;
 
-
9
9
=
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t
 
D
O
E
S
 
N
O
T
 
W
A
N
T
 
T
O
 
A
N
S
W
E
R
;
 
-
1
0
0
=
i
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
e
r
 
D
I
D
 
N
O
T
 
A
S
K
 
(
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
 
w
h
y
)
]
 
 
 
P
l
o
t
 D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
v
i
l
-
l
a
g
e
 
O
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
/
A
c
c
e
s
s
 
C
u
l
t
i
v
a
t
e
d
 
S
i
z
e
 
a
n
d
 
c
r
o
p
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
w
i
l
d
l
i
f
e
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
 
 
 
(
I
n
 
k
i
l
o
m
e
t
r
e
 
o
r
 
m
i
n
u
t
e
s
 
w
a
l
k
)
 
(
1
=
i
n
h
e
r
i
t
e
d
;
 
2
=
 
r
e
n
t
e
d
;
 
3
=
b
o
u
g
h
t
;
 
4
=
b
o
r
r
o
w
e
d
;
 
5
=
c
l
e
a
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
h
o
u
s
e
-
h
o
l
d
;
 
6
=
o
t
h
e
r
 
(
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
)
)
 
(
a
r
e
a
 
c
u
l
t
i
v
a
t
e
d
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
2
0
1
6
/
2
0
1
7
)
 
[
h
a
 
o
r
 
m
2]
 
C
r
o
p
s
 
p
l
a
n
t
e
d
 
(
i
f
 
m
o
r
e
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
m
o
r
e
 
t
h
a
n
 
o
n
e
 
c
r
o
p
 
p
e
r
 
p
l
o
t
,
 
j
u
s
t
 
l
i
s
t
 
t
h
e
m
 
h
e
r
e
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
 
b
y
 
a
 
c
o
m
m
a
)
 
H
a
s
 
t
h
i
s
 
p
l
o
t
 
b
e
e
n
 
 
d
e
v
a
s
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
f
o
p
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
s
t
 
1
2
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
?
 
(
1
+
y
e
s
,
 
0
-
=
N
o
,
 
i
f
 
n
o
,
 
m
o
v
e
 
t
o
 
n
e
x
t
 
p
l
o
t
)
 
H
o
w
 
m
a
n
y
 
t
i
m
e
s
 
h
a
s
 
i
t
 
b
e
e
n
 
d
a
m
-
a
g
e
d
 
b
y
 
e
l
e
-
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
f
p
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
s
t
 
1
2
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
?
 
A
r
e
a
 
o
f
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
 
b
y
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
(
1
=
<
2
5
%
,
 
2
=
2
5
–
5
0
%
,
 
3
=
>
5
0
–
7
5
%
,
 
4
=
>
7
5
%
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
l
o
t
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
c
u
l
-
t
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
)
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
 
(
1
=
s
l
i
g
h
t
,
 
2
=
m
o
d
e
r
a
t
e
,
 
a
n
d
 
3
=
s
e
v
e
r
e
)
 
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
W
h
i
c
h
 
o
n
e
 
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
s
 
b
e
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
o
d
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
d
 
b
y
 
y
o
u
r
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
s
t
 
1
2
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
?
 
(
1
=
 
E
n
o
u
g
h
 
f
o
o
d
 
(
b
o
t
h
 
i
n
 
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
v
a
-
r
i
e
t
y
,
 
2
=
 
E
n
o
u
g
h
 
b
u
t
 
n
o
t
 
a
l
w
a
y
s
 
t
h
e
 
t
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
f
o
o
d
 
w
e
 
w
a
n
t
 
t
o
 
e
a
t
,
 
3
=
 
N
o
t
 
e
n
o
u
g
h
 
b
o
t
h
 
i
n
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
o
f
 
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
v
a
r
i
e
t
y
,
 
4
=
 
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
 
e
n
o
u
g
h
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
 
3
 
H
o
w
 
m
a
n
y
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
d
i
d
 
y
o
u
r
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
h
a
v
e
 
e
n
o
u
g
h
 
t
o
 
e
a
t
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
s
t
 
y
e
a
r
?
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
m
o
i
s
 
 
4
 
A
p
a
r
t
 
f
r
o
m
 
c
r
o
p
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
,
 
h
a
s
 
y
o
u
r
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
a
l
s
o
 
e
x
p
[
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
d
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
w
i
l
d
l
i
f
e
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
?
 
(
1
=
Y
e
s
,
 
0
=
N
o
,
 
i
f
 
y
e
s
,
 
g
o
 
t
o
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
5
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
 
5
 
T
y
p
e
s
 
o
f
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
:
 
1
=
 
P
r
o
p
r
i
e
t
i
e
s
 
(
e
.
g
.
 
h
o
u
s
e
)
,
 
2
=
 
I
n
j
u
r
i
e
s
,
 
3
=
 
D
e
a
t
h
,
 
4
=
 
O
t
h
e
r
s
 
(
S
p
e
c
i
f
y
)
 
 
 
 
6
 
I
n
 
y
o
u
r
 
v
i
l
l
a
g
e
,
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
a
n
y
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 
k
i
l
l
e
d
 
t
o
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
 
c
r
o
p
s
?
 
H
o
w
 
m
a
n
y
?
 
(
N
u
m
b
e
r
)
 
 
 5 
D
.
 
W
e
a
l
t
h
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
:
 
L
i
v
e
s
t
o
c
k
,
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
1
 
P
l
e
a
s
e
 
t
e
l
l
 
u
s
 
h
o
w
 
m
a
n
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
l
i
v
e
s
t
o
c
k
 
d
o
e
s
 
y
o
u
r
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
l
y
 
o
w
n
 
a
 
C
a
t
t
l
e
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
b
 
P
o
r
k
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
a
 
F
i
s
h
 
t
a
n
k
s
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
b
 
B
e
e
h
i
v
e
s
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
a
 
P
o
u
l
t
r
y
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
b
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
(
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
a
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
(
s
p
e
c
i
f
y
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
C
o
u
l
d
 
y
o
u
 
p
l
e
a
s
e
 
t
e
l
l
 
u
s
 
m
o
r
e
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
y
o
u
r
 
h
o
u
s
e
(
s
)
?
 
H
o
w
 
m
a
n
y
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
a
r
e
?
 
W
h
a
t
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
y
 
m
a
d
e
 
o
f
?
 
W
h
a
t
 
k
i
n
d
 
o
f
 
r
o
o
f
 
h
a
v
e
 
t
h
e
y
 
g
o
t
?
 
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
e
y
 
a
r
e
 
y
o
u
r
 
p
e
r
m
a
n
e
n
t
 
o
r
 
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y
 
d
w
e
l
l
i
n
g
?
 
 
 
 
 
H
o
u
s
e
 
1
 
H
o
u
s
e
 
2
 
H
o
u
s
e
 
3
 
 
 
 
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
s
t
o
r
e
y
 
(
m
a
i
n
 
h
o
u
s
e
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
r
o
o
m
s
 
(
m
a
i
n
 
h
o
u
s
e
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
o
o
f
 
t
y
p
e
 
(
m
a
i
n
 
h
o
u
s
e
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
 
D
o
e
s
 
a
n
y
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
y
o
u
r
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
o
w
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
p
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
i
u
t
e
m
s
 
(
p
l
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
)
 
a
 
T
e
l
e
v
i
s
i
o
n
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
b
 
F
r
i
d
g
e
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
c
 
F
r
e
e
z
e
r
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
d
 
M
o
b
i
l
e
 
p
h
o
n
e
s
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
e
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
t
o
r
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E
.
 
N
o
r
m
s
,
 
p
e
r
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
b
e
l
i
e
f
s
:
 
W
e
 
w
i
l
l
 
m
a
k
e
 
s
o
m
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
s
,
 
p
l
e
a
s
e
 
t
e
l
l
 
m
e
 
o
n
 
a
 
s
c
a
l
e
 
o
f
 
1
 
t
o
 
4
 
t
o
 
w
h
a
t
 
d
e
g
r
e
e
 
y
o
u
 
a
g
r
e
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
e
a
c
h
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
m
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
L
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
3
=
S
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
,
 
4
=
V
e
r
y
 
m
u
c
h
,
 
-
9
8
=
D
o
n
'
t
 
k
n
o
w
,
 
-
9
9
=
D
o
n
’
t
 
w
a
n
t
 
t
o
 
a
n
s
w
e
r
)
 
1
 
E
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
h
a
r
m
 
m
y
 
w
e
l
l
-
b
e
i
n
g
.
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
2
 
E
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
t
o
 
m
y
 
w
e
l
l
-
b
e
i
n
g
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
 
P
l
e
a
s
e
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
 
e
x
a
m
p
l
e
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
3
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
E
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
 
c
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
f
u
t
u
r
e
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 
i
n
 
m
y
 
v
i
e
w
,
 
A
N
P
N
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
e
n
t
i
r
e
l
y
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
l
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
f
a
r
m
e
r
s
'
 
l
i
v
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
 
c
r
o
p
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
.
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
5
 
F
a
r
m
e
r
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
u
r
i
n
g
 
l
a
n
d
s
 
n
e
e
d
 
t
o
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
 
h
a
b
i
t
a
t
s
 
t
o
 
m
i
n
-
i
m
i
z
e
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
 
c
r
o
p
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
6
 
F
a
r
m
e
r
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
u
r
i
n
g
 
l
a
n
d
s
 
n
e
e
d
 
t
o
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
 
s
c
a
r
i
n
g
 
t
e
c
h
n
i
q
u
e
s
 
t
o
 
m
i
n
i
m
i
z
e
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
 
c
r
o
p
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
7
 
T
h
e
 
r
i
s
k
 
o
f
 
b
e
i
n
g
 
f
i
n
e
d
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
p
r
e
v
e
n
t
 
m
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
b
e
i
n
g
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
i
n
 
k
i
l
l
i
n
g
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
.
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
8
 
T
h
e
 
r
i
s
k
 
o
f
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
d
i
s
a
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
p
r
e
v
e
n
t
 
m
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
k
i
l
l
i
n
g
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
.
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
9
 
I
n
 
m
y
 
v
i
e
w
,
 
c
r
o
p
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
 
b
y
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
 
h
a
s
 
e
n
c
o
u
r
a
g
e
d
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
 
k
i
l
l
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
y
o
u
r
 
v
i
l
l
a
g
e
.
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
1
0
 
I
n
 
m
y
 
v
i
e
w
,
 
c
r
o
p
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
 
b
y
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
 
h
a
s
 
c
a
u
s
e
d
 
p
e
o
p
l
e
 
t
o
 
m
o
v
e
 
a
w
a
y
 
f
r
o
m
 
o
u
r
 
v
i
l
l
a
g
e
.
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 6 
F
.
 
T
r
u
s
t
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
1
:
 
H
o
w
 
m
u
c
h
 
t
r
u
s
t
 
d
o
 
y
o
u
 
h
a
v
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
o
r
g
a
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
m
a
k
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
d
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
l
a
n
d
 
a
n
d
 
w
i
l
d
l
i
f
e
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
:
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
L
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
3
=
S
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
,
 
4
=
V
e
r
y
 
m
u
c
h
,
 
-
9
8
=
D
o
n
'
t
 
k
n
o
w
,
 
-
9
9
=
D
o
n
’
t
 
w
a
n
t
 
t
o
 
a
n
s
w
e
r
)
 
1
 
A
N
P
N
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
2
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
d
e
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
n
e
m
e
n
t
 
e
t
 
d
e
s
 
f
o
r
e
t
s
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
3
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
o
f
 
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G
.
 
T
r
u
s
t
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
2
:
 
T
r
u
s
t
 
i
n
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
L
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
3
=
S
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
,
 
4
=
V
e
r
y
 
m
u
c
h
,
 
-
9
8
=
D
o
n
'
t
 
k
n
o
w
,
 
-
9
9
=
D
o
n
’
t
 
w
a
n
t
 
t
o
 
a
n
s
w
e
r
)
 
1
 
W
o
u
l
d
 
y
o
u
 
s
a
y
 
t
h
a
t
 
m
o
s
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
i
m
e
,
 
p
e
o
p
l
e
 
i
n
 
y
o
u
r
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
a
r
e
 
m
o
s
t
l
y
 
t
r
y
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
h
e
l
p
 
e
a
c
h
 
o
t
h
e
r
?
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
L
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
3
=
S
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
,
 
4
=
 
V
e
r
y
 
m
u
c
h
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
2
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
 
s
p
e
a
k
i
n
g
,
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
y
o
u
 
s
a
y
 
t
h
a
t
 
m
o
s
t
 
p
e
o
p
l
e
 
i
n
 
y
o
u
r
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
a
r
e
 
h
o
n
e
s
t
 
a
n
d
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
t
r
u
s
t
e
d
?
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
L
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
3
=
S
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
,
 
4
=
 
V
e
r
y
 
m
u
c
h
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
3
 
D
o
 
y
o
u
 
t
h
i
n
k
 
t
h
a
t
 
m
o
s
t
 
p
e
o
p
l
e
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
t
r
y
 
t
o
 
t
a
k
e
 
a
d
v
a
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
y
o
u
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
y
 
g
o
t
 
a
 
c
h
a
n
c
e
?
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
L
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
3
=
S
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
,
 
4
=
 
V
e
r
y
 
m
u
c
h
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
.
 
A
t
t
i
t
u
d
e
s
 
t
o
w
a
r
d
s
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 
o
p
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
I
n
 
y
o
u
r
 
o
p
i
n
i
o
n
,
 
t
o
 
w
h
a
t
 
e
x
t
e
n
t
 
d
o
 
t
h
e
 
o
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
l
i
s
t
e
d
 
b
e
l
o
w
 
a
n
s
w
e
r
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
,
 
b
 
a
n
d
 
c
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
g
a
r
d
 
t
o
 
m
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
n
g
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
-
h
u
m
a
n
 
c
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
 
?
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
l
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
t
o
 
a
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
 
e
x
t
e
n
t
,
 
3
=
 
D
e
f
i
n
i
t
e
l
y
 
Y
e
s
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
.
 
"
…
i
s
 
a
c
c
e
p
t
a
b
l
e
.
"
 
b
.
 
"
…
i
s
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
.
"
 
c
.
 
"
…
i
s
 
s
u
s
t
a
i
n
a
b
l
e
.
"
 
 
1
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
n
o
n
-
L
e
t
h
a
l
 
S
c
a
r
i
n
g
 
t
e
c
h
n
i
q
u
e
s
 
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
2
 
E
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
 
f
e
n
c
e
s
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
3
 
K
i
l
l
i
n
g
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
4
 
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
 
f
e
e
d
i
n
g
 
a
r
e
a
s
 
(
"
h
a
b
i
t
a
t
"
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
5
 
S
u
b
s
i
d
y
 
/
 
C
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
6
 
E
c
o
t
o
u
r
i
s
m
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
I
.
 
E
q
u
i
t
y
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
 
 
 
 
1
 
W
o
u
l
d
 
y
o
u
 
s
a
y
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
f
a
i
r
l
y
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
 
a
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
s
?
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
L
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
3
=
S
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
,
 
4
=
 
V
e
r
y
 
m
u
c
h
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
2
 
D
o
 
y
o
u
 
f
e
e
l
 
a
b
l
e
 
t
o
 
i
n
f
l
u
e
n
c
e
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
-
m
a
k
i
n
g
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
w
i
l
d
l
i
f
e
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
f
a
r
m
i
n
g
?
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
L
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
3
=
S
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
,
 
4
=
 
V
e
r
y
 
m
u
c
h
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
3
 
W
o
u
l
d
 
y
o
u
 
s
a
y
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
(
w
r
t
 
c
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
)
 
e
q
u
a
l
l
y
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
y
o
u
r
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
?
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
L
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
3
=
S
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
,
 
4
=
 
V
e
r
y
 
m
u
c
h
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
4
 
D
o
 
y
o
u
 
f
e
e
l
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
s
 
y
o
u
r
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
n
d
 
t
r
a
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
g
a
r
d
 
t
o
 
w
i
l
d
l
i
f
e
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
-
m
e
n
t
?
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
L
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
3
=
S
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
,
 
4
=
 
V
e
r
y
 
m
u
c
h
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
J
.
 
F
a
m
i
l
i
a
r
i
t
y
 
 
 
 
C
a
n
 
y
o
u
 
r
a
t
e
 
y
o
u
r
 
f
a
m
i
l
i
a
r
i
t
y
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
?
 
(
f
r
o
m
 
1
 
t
o
 
4
,
 
1
=
 
v
e
r
y
 
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
 
,
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
 
h
a
r
d
l
y
 
m
e
e
t
s
 
u
p
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
,
 
2
=
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
 
,
 
r
a
r
e
l
y
 
m
e
e
t
s
 
u
p
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
,
 
3
=
G
o
o
d
 
,
 
m
e
e
t
s
 
u
p
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
 
q
u
i
t
e
 
o
f
t
e
n
,
 
 
a
n
d
 
4
=
 
V
e
r
y
 
g
o
o
d
 
,
 
m
e
e
t
s
 
u
p
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
t
l
y
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
)
 
 
1
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
 
1
 
-
 
H
H
I
D
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
F
a
m
i
l
i
a
r
i
t
y
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
2
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
 
2
 
-
 
H
H
I
D
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
F
a
m
i
l
i
a
r
i
t
y
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
3
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
 
3
 
-
 
H
H
I
D
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
F
a
m
i
l
i
a
r
i
t
y
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
K
.
 
A
b
o
u
t
 
t
h
e
 
g
a
m
e
s
 
 
1
 
W
h
a
t
 
w
a
s
 
y
o
u
r
 
m
a
i
n
 
g
o
a
l
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
g
a
m
e
s
?
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
  
1
=
 
 
T
o
 
w
i
n
 
(
v
i
c
t
o
r
y
)
,
 
2
=
 
T
o
 
d
o
 
w
h
a
t
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
b
e
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
,
 
3
=
 
T
o
 
d
o
 
w
h
a
t
 
I
 
d
o
 
i
n
 
r
e
a
l
 
l
i
f
e
,
 
4
=
 
T
o
 
h
a
v
e
 
f
u
n
,
 
5
=
 
A
u
t
r
e
s
 
(
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
e
r
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
2
 
D
i
d
 
y
o
u
r
 
c
h
o
i
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
g
a
m
e
s
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
 
o
n
 
w
h
a
t
 
o
t
h
e
r
s
 
d
i
d
?
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
L
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
3
=
S
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
,
 
4
=
 
V
e
r
y
 
m
u
c
h
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
3
 
D
i
d
 
y
o
u
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
y
o
u
r
 
c
h
o
i
c
e
s
 
o
n
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
?
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
L
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
3
=
S
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
,
 
4
=
 
V
e
r
y
 
m
u
c
h
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
4
 
D
i
d
 
y
o
u
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
y
o
u
r
 
c
h
o
i
c
e
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
x
t
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
?
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
L
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
3
=
S
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
,
 
4
=
 
V
e
r
y
 
m
u
c
h
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
5
 
K
n
o
w
i
n
g
 
h
o
w
 
t
h
e
 
g
a
m
e
 
w
a
s
 
p
l
a
y
e
d
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
 
o
f
 
h
i
n
d
s
i
g
h
t
,
 
d
o
 
w
i
s
h
 
y
o
u
 
h
a
d
 
m
a
d
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
?
 
(
1
=
N
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
2
=
L
i
t
t
l
e
,
 
3
=
S
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
,
 
4
=
 
V
e
r
y
 
m
u
c
h
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
 7 
N
o
t
e
s
 
 8 
N
o
t
e
s
 
 1 
Q
uestionnaire 
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
u
r
 
l
'
e
n
q
u
e
t
e
 
 
 
A
c
t
i
v
i
t
e
s
 
D
a
t
e
 
D
e
b
u
t
 
F
i
n
s
 
P
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
a
b
l
e
 
R
e
m
a
r
q
u
e
s
 
E
n
q
u
e
t
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
V
e
r
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
u
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
S
a
i
s
i
e
 
d
e
s
 
d
o
n
n
e
e
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
V
e
r
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
e
 
l
a
 
s
a
i
s
i
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
A
.
 
I
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
:
 
E
x
p
l
i
q
u
e
r
 
q
u
e
 
l
e
s
 
d
o
n
n
e
e
s
 
s
u
i
v
a
n
t
e
s
 
n
o
u
s
 
s
e
r
o
n
t
 
u
t
i
l
e
s
 
p
o
u
r
 
d
e
s
 
e
t
u
d
e
s
 
s
p
a
t
i
a
l
e
s
,
 
p
a
r
 
e
x
e
m
p
l
e
 
p
o
u
r
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
e
r
 
l
'
i
m
p
a
c
t
 
d
e
 
l
a
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
a
u
 
p
a
r
c
 
s
u
r
 
l
e
u
r
s
 
 
m
o
y
e
n
s
 
d
e
 
s
u
b
s
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
.
 
A
 
n
o
t
e
r
 
q
u
e
 
2
.
 
3
.
 
e
t
 
5
.
 
p
e
u
v
e
n
t
 
e
t
r
e
 
r
e
m
p
l
i
s
 
a
v
a
n
t
 
l
'
e
n
q
u
e
t
e
.
 
1
 N
o
m
 
d
u
 
m
e
n
a
g
e
 
e
t
 
C
o
d
e
 
(
n
o
m
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
)
 
2
 N
o
m
 
d
u
 
v
i
l
l
a
g
e
 
e
t
 
c
o
d
e
 
 
(
n
o
m
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
)
 
3
 L
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
G
P
S
 
 
 
4
 D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
d
u
 
m
e
n
a
g
e
 
d
u
 
m
a
r
c
h
e
 
l
e
 
p
l
u
s
 
p
r
o
c
h
e
 
(
k
m
)
 
 
5
 C
o
d
e
 
d
u
 
j
e
u
 
(
G
I
D
)
 
 2 
[
B
L
A
N
K
 
P
A
G
E
 
H
E
R
E
]
 
 3 
E
n
q
u
e
t
e
 
m
e
n
a
g
e
 
 
 
 
H
H
I
D
:
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
B
.
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
u
r
 
l
e
 
m
e
n
a
g
e
 
1
 
L
e
 
r
é
p
o
n
d
a
n
t
 
e
s
t
-
i
l
 
l
e
 
c
h
e
f
 
d
e
 
f
o
y
e
r
?
 
(
1
=
O
u
i
,
 
2
=
N
o
n
)
S
i
 
n
o
n
,
 
p
o
s
e
z
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
2
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
2
 
Q
u
e
l
l
e
 
e
s
t
 
l
a
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
e
n
t
r
e
 
l
e
 
r
é
p
o
n
d
a
n
t
 
e
t
 
l
e
 
c
h
e
f
 
d
u
 
f
o
y
e
r
?
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
 
 
1
=
E
p
o
u
x
 
(
s
e
)
,
 
2
=
F
i
l
s
 
/
 
F
i
l
l
e
,
 
3
=
P
e
t
i
t
 
F
i
l
s
/
P
e
t
i
t
e
 
F
i
l
l
e
,
 
4
=
M
e
r
e
/
P
e
r
e
,
 
5
=
F
r
e
r
e
 
/
 
S
o
e
u
r
,
 
6
=
A
u
t
r
e
s
 
(
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
e
r
)
 
3
 
Q
u
e
l
 
a
g
e
 
a
v
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
?
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
a
n
s
 
4
 
G
e
n
r
e
 
(
1
=
F
e
m
i
n
i
n
,
 
2
=
M
a
s
c
u
l
i
n
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
5
 
Q
u
e
l
 
e
s
t
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
n
i
v
e
a
u
 
s
c
o
l
a
i
r
e
 
f
i
n
a
l
?
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
a
n
s
 
6
 
C
o
m
b
i
e
n
 
d
'
a
n
n
e
e
s
 
a
v
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
v
e
c
u
 
d
a
n
s
 
c
e
 
v
i
l
l
a
g
e
?
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
a
n
s
 
7
 
C
o
m
b
i
e
n
 
d
'
a
n
n
e
e
s
 
c
u
l
t
i
v
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
i
c
i
?
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
a
n
s
 
8
 
C
o
m
b
i
e
n
 
d
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
s
 
v
i
v
e
n
t
 
s
o
u
s
 
l
e
 
m
e
m
e
 
t
o
i
t
?
 
[
I
n
c
l
u
r
e
 
s
e
u
l
e
m
e
n
t
 
l
e
s
 
m
e
m
b
r
e
s
 
d
u
 
f
o
y
e
r
 
q
u
i
 
v
i
v
e
n
t
 
6
 
m
o
i
s
 
o
u
 
p
l
u
s
 
s
o
u
s
 
l
e
 
m
e
m
e
 
t
o
i
t
]
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
9
 
C
o
m
b
i
e
n
 
d
e
 
m
e
m
b
r
e
s
 
d
e
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
f
o
y
e
r
 
n
e
 
v
i
v
e
n
t
 
p
a
s
 
i
c
i
 
p
e
n
d
a
n
t
 
s
i
x
 
m
o
i
s
 
o
u
 
p
l
u
s
?
 
[
s
i
 
c
'
e
s
t
 
0
,
 
p
a
s
s
e
z
 
a
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
1
2
]
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
1
0
 
P
o
u
r
 
q
u
e
l
l
e
s
 
r
a
i
s
o
n
s
 
c
e
s
 
m
e
m
b
r
e
s
 
d
e
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
f
o
y
e
r
 
v
i
v
e
n
t
 
a
i
l
l
e
u
r
s
?
 
(
c
o
d
e
 
1
=
E
t
u
d
i
e
r
,
 
2
=
T
r
a
v
a
i
l
l
e
r
,
 
3
=
A
u
t
r
e
s
 
[
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
e
z
]
)
 
 
 
1
1
 
E
s
t
-
c
e
 
q
u
e
 
q
u
e
 
c
e
s
 
m
e
m
b
r
e
s
 
v
i
v
a
n
t
 
a
i
l
l
e
u
r
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
e
n
t
-
i
l
s
 
a
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
 
o
u
 
a
 
v
o
s
 
d
e
p
e
n
s
e
s
 
(
c
o
d
e
 
1
=
r
e
v
e
n
u
,
 
2
=
d
e
p
e
n
s
e
s
)
 
 
 
1
2
 
Q
u
e
l
l
e
 
e
s
t
 
l
a
 
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
a
l
e
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
 
d
e
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
 
d
e
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
f
o
y
e
r
?
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
 
 
1
=
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
;
 
 
2
=
F
o
n
c
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
 
d
'
E
t
a
t
;
 
3
=
E
m
p
l
o
i
 
p
r
i
v
é
 
(
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
e
,
 
a
r
t
i
s
a
n
a
t
,
 
m
o
t
e
l
,
 
A
N
P
N
)
;
 
4
=
P
e
c
h
e
,
 
5
=
C
h
a
s
s
e
 
e
t
 
r
e
c
o
l
t
e
 
d
e
s
 
p
r
o
d
u
i
t
s
 
s
a
u
v
a
n
g
e
s
;
 
6
=
A
u
t
r
e
s
 
(
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
e
r
)
 
1
3
 
Q
u
e
l
l
e
 
e
s
t
 
l
a
 
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
i
r
e
 
d
e
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
 
d
e
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
f
o
y
e
r
?
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
 
 
1
=
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
;
 
 
2
=
F
o
n
c
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
 
d
'
E
t
a
t
;
 
3
=
E
m
p
l
o
i
 
p
r
i
v
é
 
(
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
e
,
 
a
r
t
i
s
a
n
a
t
,
 
m
o
t
e
l
,
 
A
N
P
N
)
;
 
4
=
P
e
c
h
e
,
 
5
=
C
h
a
s
s
e
 
e
t
 
r
e
c
o
l
t
e
 
d
e
s
 
p
r
o
d
u
i
t
s
 
s
a
u
v
a
n
g
e
s
;
 
6
=
A
u
t
r
e
s
 
(
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
e
r
)
 
1
4
 
V
o
t
r
e
 
f
o
y
e
r
 
a
-
t
-
i
l
 
b
é
n
é
f
i
c
i
é
 
d
e
s
 
p
r
o
j
e
t
s
 
d
e
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
p
e
m
e
n
t
 
(
a
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
,
 
e
l
e
v
a
g
e
,
 
o
u
 
a
u
t
r
e
 
p
r
o
j
e
t
s
 
d
e
 
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
)
 
a
u
 
c
o
u
r
s
 
d
e
s
 
1
2
 
d
e
r
n
i
e
r
s
 
m
o
i
s
?
 
 
(
1
=
O
u
i
,
 
2
=
N
o
n
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
 4 
C
.
 
P
r
a
t
i
q
u
e
s
 
a
g
r
i
c
o
l
e
s
:
 
A
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
e
t
 
u
t
i
l
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
e
s
 
t
e
r
r
e
s
 
e
t
 
d
e
v
a
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
c
a
u
s
é
e
s
 
p
a
r
 
l
a
 
f
a
u
n
e
  
1
 
[
C
o
m
m
e
n
c
e
r
 
p
a
r
 
d
e
m
a
n
d
e
r
 
c
o
m
b
i
e
n
 
d
e
 
c
h
a
m
p
s
 
a
v
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
c
u
l
t
i
v
é
s
 
a
u
 
c
o
u
r
s
 
d
e
 
l
'
a
n
n
e
e
 
d
e
r
n
i
e
r
e
?
 
P
u
i
s
 
c
o
m
m
e
n
c
e
r
 
p
a
r
 
l
e
 
p
r
e
m
i
e
r
 
c
h
a
m
p
 
e
t
 
p
o
s
-
e
r
 
l
e
s
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
 
s
u
i
v
a
n
t
e
s
 
p
o
u
r
 
c
h
a
q
u
e
 
c
h
a
m
p
:
 
À
 
q
u
e
l
l
e
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
s
o
n
t
-
e
l
l
e
s
 
d
u
 
c
e
n
t
r
e
 
d
u
 
v
i
l
l
a
g
e
?
 
Q
u
e
l
l
e
 
e
s
t
 
l
a
 
t
a
i
l
l
e
?
 
e
t
c
.
]
 
[
C
o
d
e
s
 
d
e
 
r
é
p
o
n
s
e
 
(
n
o
n
)
:
 
-
9
8
 
=
 
l
e
 
r
é
p
o
n
d
a
n
t
 
N
E
 
S
A
I
T
 
P
A
S
;
 
-
9
9
 
=
 
l
e
 
r
é
p
o
n
d
a
n
t
 
N
E
 
V
E
U
T
 
P
A
S
 
R
É
P
O
N
D
R
E
;
 
-
1
0
0
 
=
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
e
r
 
N
'
A
 
P
A
S
 
D
E
M
A
N
D
É
 
(
p
r
é
c
i
s
e
z
 
p
o
u
r
q
u
o
i
)
]
 
 
 
 
 
C
h
a
m
p
s
 
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
d
u
 
v
i
l
-
l
a
g
e
 
A
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
d
e
s
 
t
e
r
r
e
s
 
S
u
p
e
r
f
i
c
i
e
s
 
c
u
l
t
i
v
e
e
s
 
e
t
 
t
y
p
e
s
 
d
e
 
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
s
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
u
r
s
 
d
e
 
d
e
v
a
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
 
 
 
 
(
E
n
 
k
i
l
o
m
è
t
r
e
 
o
u
 
m
i
n
u
t
e
s
 
d
e
 
m
a
r
c
h
e
)
 
(
1
 
=
 
h
é
r
i
t
é
,
 
2
 
=
 
l
o
u
é
,
 
3
 
=
 
e
m
p
r
u
n
-
t
é
,
 
4
=
A
c
h
e
t
é
,
 
5
 
=
 
a
u
t
r
e
 
(
p
r
é
c
i
s
e
r
)
)
 
S
u
p
e
r
f
i
c
i
e
 
c
u
l
t
i
v
e
e
 
l
'
a
n
n
e
e
 
d
e
r
n
i
e
r
e
 
[
m
2
]
 
-
 
s
i
 
l
e
 
m
e
n
a
g
e
 
n
e
 
p
e
u
t
 
p
a
s
 
e
s
t
i
m
e
r
 
l
e
s
 
m
2
 
o
u
 
h
a
,
 
c
h
o
i
s
i
s
s
e
z
 
p
a
r
m
i
:
 
1
=
P
e
t
i
t
,
 
2
=
M
o
y
e
n
,
 
3
=
G
r
a
n
d
 
C
u
l
t
u
r
e
s
 
p
l
a
n
t
é
e
s
 
[
l
i
s
t
e
z
-
l
e
s
 
i
c
i
 
e
t
 
s
é
p
a
r
e
z
-
l
e
s
 
p
a
r
 
u
n
e
 
v
i
r
g
u
l
e
]
 
C
e
 
c
h
a
m
p
 
a
-
t
-
i
l
 
é
t
é
 
d
e
v
a
s
t
é
 
p
a
r
 
l
e
s
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
?
 
(
1
=
O
u
i
,
 
2
=
n
o
n
)
 
S
i
 
n
o
n
,
 
p
a
s
s
e
r
 
a
 
C
.
2
 
F
r
é
q
u
e
n
c
e
 
d
e
s
 
d
é
-
v
a
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
u
 
c
o
u
r
s
 
d
e
 
l
'
a
n
n
é
e
 
d
e
r
n
i
e
r
e
 D
é
g
â
t
s
 
c
a
u
s
é
s
 
p
a
r
 
l
e
s
 
é
l
é
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
(
1
=
p
e
t
i
t
 
d
e
g
a
t
 
(
0
-
3
0
%
)
,
 
2
=
d
e
g
a
t
 
m
o
y
e
n
 
(
3
0
%
-
6
0
%
)
,
 
3
=
g
r
a
n
d
 
d
e
g
a
t
 
(
>
6
0
%
)
 
T
e
c
h
n
i
q
u
e
s
 
d
e
 
d
i
s
s
u
a
s
i
o
n
 
d
e
s
 
é
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
u
t
i
-
l
i
s
é
e
s
 
a
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
L
e
q
u
e
l
 
d
é
c
r
i
t
 
l
e
 
m
i
e
u
x
 
l
a
 
n
o
u
r
r
i
t
u
r
e
 
c
o
n
s
o
m
m
é
e
 
d
a
n
s
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
m
é
n
a
g
e
 
a
u
 
c
o
u
r
s
 
d
e
s
 
1
2
 
d
e
r
n
i
e
r
s
 
m
o
i
s
?
 
(
1
=
a
s
s
e
z
 
d
e
 
n
o
u
r
r
i
t
u
r
e
 
q
u
e
 
n
o
u
s
 
v
o
u
l
o
n
s
 
m
a
n
g
e
r
,
 
2
=
A
s
s
e
z
 
m
a
i
s
 
p
a
s
 
t
o
u
j
o
u
r
s
 
l
e
 
t
y
p
e
 
d
e
 
n
o
u
r
r
i
t
u
r
e
 
q
u
e
 
n
o
u
s
 
v
o
u
l
o
n
s
 
m
a
n
g
e
r
,
 
3
=
 
P
a
s
 
a
s
s
e
z
 
a
 
m
a
n
g
e
r
 
a
u
s
s
i
 
b
i
e
n
 
e
n
 
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
e
 
q
u
'
e
n
 
v
a
r
i
-
e
t
e
;
 
4
=
P
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
 
a
s
s
e
z
 
a
 
m
a
n
g
e
r
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
3
 
C
o
m
b
i
e
n
 
d
e
 
m
o
i
s
 
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
m
e
n
a
g
e
 
a
 
t
-
i
l
 
e
u
 
a
s
s
e
z
 
a
 
m
a
n
g
e
r
 
a
u
 
c
o
u
r
s
 
d
e
s
 
1
2
 
d
e
r
n
i
e
r
 
m
o
i
s
?
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
 
m
o
i
s
 
4
 
A
 
p
a
r
t
 
l
e
s
 
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
a
v
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
a
u
s
s
i
 
s
u
b
i
s
 
d
'
a
u
t
r
e
s
 
t
y
p
e
s
 
d
e
 
d
e
g
a
t
s
 
a
 
c
a
u
s
e
 
d
e
s
 
é
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
a
u
 
c
o
u
r
s
 
d
e
s
 
1
2
 
d
e
r
n
i
e
r
s
 
m
o
i
s
?
 
(
1
=
O
u
i
,
 
2
=
N
o
n
)
 
-
 
S
i
 
o
u
i
,
 
p
o
s
e
r
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
5
,
 
s
i
n
o
n
,
 
p
a
s
s
e
r
 
a
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
6
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
5
 
T
y
p
e
s
 
d
e
 
d
e
g
a
t
s
:
 
1
=
P
r
o
p
r
i
e
t
e
s
 
(
m
a
i
s
o
n
,
 
c
o
u
r
s
 
d
’
e
a
u
)
,
 
2
=
B
l
e
s
s
u
r
e
,
 
3
=
M
o
r
t
,
 
4
=
u
t
r
e
s
 
(
p
r
e
c
i
s
e
z
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
6
 
D
a
n
s
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
v
i
l
l
a
g
e
,
 
y
 
a
-
t
-
i
l
 
e
u
 
d
e
s
 
é
l
é
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
q
u
i
 
o
n
t
 
é
t
é
 
t
u
é
s
 
p
a
r
 
d
e
s
 
m
e
m
b
r
e
s
 
d
e
 
l
a
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
a
u
t
é
 
a
u
 
c
o
u
r
s
 
d
e
s
 
1
2
 
d
e
r
n
i
e
r
s
 
m
o
i
s
 
d
a
n
s
 
l
e
 
b
u
t
 
d
e
 
p
r
o
t
é
g
e
r
 
l
e
s
 
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
s
?
 
S
i
 
o
u
i
 
C
o
m
b
i
e
n
?
 
(
s
i
 
n
o
n
,
 
m
e
t
t
e
z
 
0
)
 
(
N
o
m
b
r
e
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
.
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
u
r
s
 
d
e
 
r
i
c
h
e
s
s
e
:
 
é
l
e
v
a
g
e
,
 
m
a
i
s
o
n
,
 
b
i
e
n
s
 
1
 
P
o
u
v
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
n
o
u
s
 
d
i
r
e
 
c
o
m
b
i
e
n
 
d
e
 
c
e
s
 
a
n
i
m
a
u
x
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
m
é
n
a
g
e
 
p
o
s
s
è
d
e
-
t
-
i
l
 
a
c
t
u
e
l
l
e
m
e
n
t
?
 
 
 
a
 M
o
u
t
o
n
s
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
b
 C
h
e
v
r
e
s
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
c
 V
o
l
a
i
l
l
e
s
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
d
 B
e
t
a
i
l
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
e
 A
u
t
r
e
s
 
(
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
e
r
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 5 
E
.
 
N
o
r
m
e
s
,
 
p
e
r
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
c
r
o
y
a
n
c
e
s
:
 
[
N
o
t
e
r
 
d
a
n
s
 
q
u
e
l
l
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
 
l
e
 
r
e
p
o
n
d
a
n
t
 
e
s
t
 
d
'
a
c
c
o
r
d
 
a
v
e
c
 
l
e
s
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
 
s
u
i
v
a
n
t
e
s
]
 
[
S
i
 
l
e
 
r
e
p
o
n
d
a
n
t
 
N
E
 
S
A
I
T
 
P
A
S
,
 
m
e
t
t
e
z
 
"
-
9
8
"
;
 
s
i
 
l
e
 
r
é
p
o
n
d
a
n
t
 
N
E
 
V
E
U
T
 
P
A
S
 
R
É
P
O
N
D
R
E
,
 
m
e
t
t
e
z
 
 
-
9
9
]
 
1
 
L
e
s
 
é
l
é
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
n
u
i
s
e
n
t
-
i
l
s
 
a
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
b
i
e
n
-
e
t
r
e
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
2
 
L
e
s
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
e
n
t
-
i
l
s
 
a
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
b
i
e
n
-
e
t
r
e
?
 
[
C
i
t
e
z
 
p
a
r
 
e
x
e
m
p
l
e
,
 
f
e
r
t
i
l
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
e
c
o
t
o
u
r
i
s
m
e
,
 
e
t
c
.
]
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
3
 
P
e
n
s
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
q
u
e
 
l
a
 
c
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
e
s
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
e
s
t
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
e
 
p
o
u
r
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
u
t
u
r
e
)
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
4
 
P
e
n
s
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
q
u
e
 
l
'
A
N
P
N
 
d
e
v
r
a
i
t
 
e
t
r
e
 
e
n
t
i
e
r
e
m
e
n
t
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
a
b
l
e
 
d
e
 
l
a
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
d
e
 
v
o
s
 
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
e
 
l
e
s
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
5
 
S
e
l
o
n
 
v
o
u
s
,
 
 
l
e
s
 
g
e
n
s
 
d
e
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
a
u
t
é
 
d
e
v
r
a
i
e
n
t
-
i
l
s
 
c
o
o
p
é
r
e
r
 
d
a
n
s
 
l
e
s
 
t
e
c
h
n
i
q
u
e
s
 
d
e
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
d
e
 
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
s
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
6
 
E
s
t
-
c
e
 
q
u
e
 
l
e
 
r
i
s
q
u
e
 
d
e
 
s
e
 
v
o
i
r
 
e
m
p
r
i
s
o
n
n
e
r
 
v
o
u
s
 
e
m
p
ê
c
h
e
r
a
i
t
 
d
'
a
b
a
t
t
r
e
 
u
n
 
é
l
é
p
h
a
n
t
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
7
 
E
s
t
-
c
e
 
q
u
e
 
l
e
 
r
i
s
q
u
e
 
d
'
e
t
r
e
 
c
o
n
d
a
m
n
é
 
p
a
r
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
a
u
t
e
 
v
o
u
s
 
e
m
p
ê
c
h
e
r
a
i
t
 
d
'
a
b
a
t
t
r
e
 
u
n
 
é
l
é
p
h
a
n
t
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
8
 
E
s
t
-
c
e
 
q
u
e
 
l
e
s
 
d
é
g
a
t
s
 
c
a
u
s
e
s
 
p
a
r
 
l
e
s
 
é
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
s
u
r
 
v
o
s
 
c
h
a
m
p
s
 
a
 
p
o
u
s
s
é
 
n
o
t
r
e
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
a
u
t
e
a
 
a
 
f
a
i
r
e
 
p
l
u
s
 
d
e
 
c
h
a
s
s
e
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
9
 
E
s
t
-
c
e
 
q
u
e
 
l
e
s
 
d
é
g
a
t
s
 
c
a
u
s
e
s
 
p
a
r
 
l
e
s
 
é
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
s
u
r
 
v
o
s
 
c
h
a
m
p
s
 
o
n
t
 
p
o
u
s
s
é
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
a
u
t
e
a
 
a
 
q
u
i
t
t
e
r
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
v
i
l
l
a
g
e
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
F
.
 
I
n
d
i
c
e
 
d
e
 
c
o
n
f
i
a
n
c
e
 
1
:
 
Q
u
e
l
l
e
 
c
o
n
f
i
a
n
c
e
 
a
v
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
d
a
n
s
 
l
'
o
r
g
a
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
u
i
v
a
n
t
e
 
p
o
u
r
 
p
r
e
n
d
r
e
 
o
u
 
s
u
g
g
e
r
e
r
 
d
e
s
 
d
é
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
 
é
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
é
e
s
 
c
o
n
c
e
r
n
a
n
t
 
l
a
 
g
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
d
e
s
 
t
e
r
r
e
s
 
a
g
r
i
c
o
l
e
s
 
e
t
 
l
a
 
c
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
e
s
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
:
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
1
 
A
N
P
N
 (
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
2
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
e
 
d
e
s
 
E
a
u
x
 
e
t
 
F
o
r
e
t
s
 (
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
3
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
e
 
d
e
 
l
'
a
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
 (
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
2
 
P
o
u
r
r
i
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
n
o
u
s
 
e
n
 
d
i
r
e
 
p
l
u
s
 
s
u
r
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
(
v
o
s
)
 
m
a
i
s
o
n
 
(
s
)
?
 
C
o
m
b
i
e
n
 
y
 
e
n
 
a
-
t
-
i
l
?
 
D
e
 
q
u
o
i
 
s
o
n
t
-
i
l
s
 
f
a
i
t
s
?
 
Q
u
e
l
 
g
e
n
r
e
 
d
e
 
t
o
i
t
 
o
n
t
-
i
l
s
?
 
[
C
o
m
m
e
n
c
e
r
 
p
a
r
 
l
e
 
l
o
g
e
m
e
n
t
 
p
e
r
m
a
n
e
n
t
]
 
 
 
 
 
a
.
M
a
i
s
o
n
 
1
 
(
p
e
r
m
a
n
e
n
t
)
 
b
.
M
a
i
s
o
n
 
2
 
c
.
M
a
i
s
o
n
 
3
 
 
 
M
a
t
i
e
r
e
 
d
e
 
l
a
 
m
a
i
s
o
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
o
m
b
r
e
 
d
e
 
c
h
a
m
b
r
e
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
y
p
e
 
d
e
 
t
o
i
t
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
y
p
e
 
d
e
 
s
o
l
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
 
V
o
t
r
e
 
m
e
n
a
g
e
 
p
o
s
s
e
d
e
 
t
-
i
l
 
l
e
s
 
b
i
e
n
s
 
s
u
i
v
a
n
t
s
?
 
[
n
o
t
e
z
 
l
e
 
n
o
m
b
r
e
 
d
e
 
b
i
e
n
s
 
p
o
u
r
 
c
h
a
q
u
e
 
t
y
p
e
]
 
N
o
m
b
r
e
 
a
 F
r
i
g
o
 
/
 
c
o
n
g
e
l
a
t
e
u
r
 
 
 
b
 T
e
l
e
 
 
 
c
 T
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
e
 
p
o
r
t
a
b
l
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 
L
e
q
u
e
l
 
d
e
 
c
e
s
 
o
u
t
i
l
s
 
u
t
i
l
i
s
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
p
o
u
r
 
c
u
i
r
e
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
n
o
u
r
r
i
t
u
r
e
?
 
[
c
o
d
e
:
 
1
=
F
o
u
r
,
 
2
=
R
e
c
h
a
u
d
,
 
3
=
F
e
u
x
 
a
 
b
o
i
s
,
 
4
=
A
u
t
r
e
s
 
[
P
r
e
c
i
s
e
z
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
|
 
 
 
 
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
 6 
I
.
 
i
n
d
i
c
e
 
d
'
é
q
u
i
t
é
 
 
 
 
1
 
D
i
r
i
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
l
e
 
g
o
u
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
t
é
g
e
 
e
q
u
i
t
a
b
l
e
m
e
n
t
 
v
o
s
 
i
n
t
é
r
ê
t
s
 
a
g
r
i
c
o
l
e
s
 
e
t
 
l
e
s
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
f
s
 
d
e
 
 
c
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
2
 
E
s
t
-
c
e
 
q
u
e
 
l
e
 
g
o
u
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
e
c
o
u
t
e
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
 
d
e
 
v
u
e
 
e
n
 
m
a
t
i
e
r
e
 
d
e
 
c
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
e
t
 
d
e
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
p
e
m
e
n
t
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
3
 
E
s
t
-
c
e
 
q
u
e
 
l
a
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
q
u
e
 
a
c
t
u
e
l
l
e
 
d
u
 
g
o
u
v
e
r
n
e
m
e
n
t
 
e
n
 
m
a
t
i
e
r
e
 
d
e
 
c
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
e
t
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
p
e
m
e
n
t
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
 
l
e
s
 
m
e
m
e
s
 
a
v
a
n
t
a
g
e
s
 
p
o
u
r
 
t
o
u
t
 
l
e
 
m
o
n
d
e
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
4
 
S
e
l
o
n
 
v
o
u
s
,
 
e
s
t
-
c
e
 
q
u
e
 
l
e
s
 
b
a
r
r
i
e
r
e
s
 
e
l
e
c
t
r
i
q
u
e
s
 
 
s
o
n
t
 
c
o
m
p
a
t
i
b
l
e
s
 
a
v
e
c
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
 
t
r
a
d
i
t
i
o
n
 
l
o
c
a
l
e
 
e
t
 
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
s
 
e
n
 
m
a
t
i
e
r
e
 
d
e
 
p
l
a
n
-
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
J
.
 
S
u
r
 
l
e
 
j
e
u
 
1
 
Q
u
e
l
 
e
t
a
i
t
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
f
 
d
a
n
s
 
l
e
 
j
e
u
?
 
(
c
o
d
e
:
 
1
=
 
G
a
g
n
e
r
 
(
v
i
c
t
o
i
r
e
)
,
 
2
=
F
a
i
r
e
 
c
e
 
q
u
i
 
s
e
r
a
i
t
 
l
e
 
m
i
e
u
x
 
p
o
u
r
 
l
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
e
,
 
3
=
 
P
r
e
n
d
r
e
 
d
e
s
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
 
c
o
m
m
e
 
d
a
n
s
 
l
a
 
 
v
i
e
 
r
e
e
l
l
e
,
 
4
=
 
S
'
a
m
u
s
e
r
,
 
5
=
 
A
u
t
r
e
s
 
(
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
e
r
)
 
 
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
2
 
V
o
s
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
 
d
a
n
s
 
l
e
s
 
j
e
u
x
 
d
é
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
-
e
l
l
e
s
 
d
e
 
c
e
 
q
u
e
 
l
e
s
 
a
u
t
r
e
s
 
f
e
r
a
i
e
n
t
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
3
 
A
v
i
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
é
r
é
 
l
e
s
 
e
f
f
e
t
s
 
d
e
 
v
o
s
 
d
é
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
 
s
u
r
 
l
e
s
 
a
u
t
r
e
s
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
4
 
A
v
i
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
é
r
é
 
l
e
s
 
e
f
f
e
t
s
 
d
e
 
v
o
s
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
 
s
u
r
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
u
t
u
r
e
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
K
.
 
R
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
1
 
L
a
q
u
e
l
l
e
 
d
e
 
o
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
s
u
i
v
a
n
t
e
s
 
i
n
d
i
q
u
e
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
v
e
c
 
l
e
s
 
a
u
t
r
e
s
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
d
u
 
j
e
u
?
 
(
d
e
 
1
 
a
 
4
,
 
1
=
P
a
s
 
d
'
a
f
f
i
n
i
t
e
,
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
t
é
e
 
t
r
e
s
 
r
a
r
e
-
m
e
n
t
,
 
 
2
=
A
f
f
i
n
i
t
e
 
a
s
s
e
z
 
l
i
m
i
t
é
e
,
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
t
é
e
 
r
a
r
e
m
e
n
t
,
 
3
=
B
o
n
n
e
 
a
f
f
i
n
i
t
e
,
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
t
é
e
 
a
s
s
e
z
 
s
o
u
v
e
n
t
,
 
4
=
T
r
e
s
 
b
o
n
n
e
 
a
f
f
i
n
i
t
e
/
e
n
t
e
n
t
e
,
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
t
é
e
 
t
r
e
s
 
s
o
u
v
e
n
t
)
 
 
[
a
j
o
u
t
e
r
 
s
e
u
l
e
m
e
n
t
 
l
e
 
c
o
d
e
 
d
u
 
m
e
n
a
g
e
 
a
p
r
e
s
 
l
'
e
n
q
u
e
t
e
]
 
a
 R
e
a
l
t
i
o
n
 
a
v
e
c
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
n
o
m
 
e
t
 
c
o
d
e
)
 I
n
d
i
c
e
 
d
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
b
 R
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
v
e
c
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
n
o
m
 
e
t
 
c
o
d
e
)
 I
n
d
i
c
e
 
d
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
c
 R
e
a
l
t
i
o
n
 
a
v
e
c
 
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
n
o
m
 
e
t
 
c
o
d
e
)
 I
n
d
i
c
e
 
d
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
H
.
 
A
t
t
i
t
u
d
e
s
 
à
 
l
'
é
g
a
r
d
 
d
e
s
 
o
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
d
e
 
g
e
s
t
i
o
n
:
 
D
a
n
s
 
q
u
e
l
l
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
 
l
e
s
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
e
s
 
d
e
 
g
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
d
e
s
 
c
o
n
f
l
i
t
s
 
c
i
t
é
e
s
 
c
i
-
d
e
s
s
o
u
s
 
r
e
-
p
o
n
d
e
n
t
-
e
l
l
e
s
 
a
u
x
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
,
 
b
 
e
t
 
c
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
 
 
 
 
a
.
 
"
…
e
s
t
 
a
c
c
e
p
t
a
b
l
e
.
"
 
b
.
 
"
…
.
e
s
t
 
e
f
f
i
c
a
c
e
 
d
a
n
s
 
l
'
a
t
t
e
n
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
e
s
 
d
e
g
a
t
s
.
"
 
c
.
 
"
…
e
s
t
 
v
i
a
b
l
e
 
a
 
l
o
n
g
 
t
e
r
m
e
.
"
 
1
 
T
e
c
h
n
i
q
u
e
s
 
l
o
c
a
l
e
s
 
N
A
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
2
 
B
a
r
r
i
e
r
e
s
 
e
l
e
t
r
i
q
u
e
s
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
3
 
A
b
a
t
t
a
g
e
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
4
 
Z
o
n
e
s
 
p
o
u
r
 
e
l
e
p
h
a
n
t
s
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
5
 
S
u
b
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
 
/
 
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
6
 
E
c
o
t
o
u
r
i
s
m
e
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
G
.
 
I
n
d
i
c
e
 
d
e
 
c
o
n
f
i
a
n
c
e
 
2
:
 
C
o
n
f
i
a
n
c
e
 
e
n
v
e
r
s
 
l
e
s
 
a
u
t
r
e
s
 
m
e
m
b
r
e
s
 
d
e
 
l
a
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
a
u
t
é
  
[
S
i
 
l
e
 
r
e
p
o
n
d
a
n
t
 
N
E
 
S
A
I
T
 
P
A
S
,
 
m
e
t
t
e
z
 
"
-
9
8
"
;
 
s
i
 
l
e
 
r
é
p
o
n
d
a
n
t
 
N
E
 
V
E
U
T
 
P
A
S
 
R
É
P
O
N
D
R
E
,
 
m
e
t
t
e
z
 
 
-
9
9
]
 
1
 
D
i
r
i
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
q
u
e
 
l
a
 
p
l
u
p
a
r
t
 
d
u
 
t
e
m
p
s
 
l
e
s
 
g
e
n
s
 
d
a
n
s
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
a
u
t
é
 
e
s
s
a
y
e
n
t
 
d
e
 
s
'
e
n
t
r
a
i
d
e
r
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
2
 
A
v
e
z
-
v
o
u
s
 
c
o
n
f
i
a
n
c
e
 
a
 
l
a
 
p
l
u
p
a
r
t
 
d
e
s
 
g
e
n
s
 
d
a
n
s
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
a
u
t
é
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
3
 
E
n
 
g
é
n
é
r
a
l
,
 
e
s
t
-
c
e
 
q
u
e
 
l
e
s
 
g
e
n
s
 
d
e
 
v
o
t
r
e
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
a
u
t
é
 
p
r
ê
t
e
n
t
 
d
e
 
l
'
a
r
g
e
n
t
 
l
e
s
 
u
n
s
 
a
u
x
 
a
u
t
r
e
s
 
e
n
 
c
a
s
 
d
e
 
b
e
s
o
i
n
,
 
e
t
 
r
é
c
u
p
è
r
e
n
t
 
l
'
a
r
g
e
n
t
 
q
u
'
i
l
s
 
o
n
t
 
p
r
ê
t
é
?
 
(
1
=
p
a
s
 
d
u
 
t
o
u
t
,
 
2
=
 
u
n
 
p
e
u
,
 
3
=
d
a
n
s
 
u
n
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
e
 
m
e
s
u
r
e
,
 
4
=
T
o
u
t
 
a
 
f
a
i
t
)
 
(
c
o
d
e
)
 
